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I'm seeing soldiers, bandits, actually coming to take away this
stuff [crude oil] and develop their own home while pretending to
be running Nigeria. Oil has brought nothing but disaster to our
people.1
I Chinedu Reginald Ezetah, International Law of Self-Determination and the
Ogoni Question: Mirroring Africa's Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 811, 816 n.24 (1997) (quoting Ken Saro Wiwa). Wiwa was the leader of
the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). he was executed in 1995
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I. Introduction
The negative social, economic, and environmental effects of
oil and gas development in Nigeria are glaring. While Nigeria, as
a country, has seen the effects of what economists refer to as the
"resource curse, ' 2 people in the oil-producing communities have
experienced the adverse effects of oil production more than the
rest of the country.3 Over the years, a number of legislative
initiatives, policy instruments, and private arrangements have been
introduced to address the problems faced by these communities.4
This article focuses on the role that both the Nigerian
government and oil corporations have played to ameliorate the
plight of oil producing communities, which have more directly
borne the brunt of oil and gas development than any other part of
Nigeria.5 The government's approach has been two-pronged:
corrective, attempting to repair the damage done by oil and gas
development and progressive, providing opportunities for people
in these communities to share in the benefits of petroleum
after a trial that was widely condemned for not meeting basic due process requirements.
Newshour: Nigerian Execution (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1995), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/africa 11-10b.html.
2 The "resource curse" is a paradoxical situation in which there exists an inverse
relationship between endowment with natural resources and economic growth. See
RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN MINERAL ECONOMIES: THE RESOURCE
CURSE THESIS (1993). See also ALAN GELB, OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE?
(1988) (stating that for countries who export oil, it is ordinary to see an inverse
relationship between oil exploration and subsequent growth and development);
MENACHEM KATZ, ET AL., LIFTING THE OIL CURSE: IMPROVING PETROLEUM REVENUE
MANAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (International Monetary Fund 2004) (stating that
macroeconomics, oil sector policies, and governance issues may be related to the inverse
relationship between domestic oil production and subsequent domestic growth in African
nations).
3 See AUGUSTINE A. IKEIN, THE IMPACT OF OIL ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: THE
CASE OF NIGERIA 25-26 (1990).
4 See, e.g., Niger-Delta Dev. Comm'n Act of 2000 (2000), Niger-Delta
Development Commission, at www.nddconline.org/TheNDDCAct.shtml (last visited
Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter NDDC Act]; JEDRZEJ GEORG FRYNAS: OIL IN NIGERIA:
CONFLICT AND LITIGATION BETWEEN OIL COMPANIES AND VILLAGE COMMUNITIES § 6
(2000); Kingsley Kybeyinje & Tony Nezianya, Delta Communities Protest Neglect,
AFRICAN RECOVERY ONLINE (June 1999), at www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/
vol 13no l/delta.htm.
5 See, e.g., EMANUEL U. NNADOZIE, OIL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CRISIS IN NIGERIA 1
(1995) (discussing the people of Egbema in southeastern Nigeria); IKEIN, supra note 3, at
26, 131.
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exploration and extraction.6
The two major vehicles by which the Nigerian government has
manifested its intention in the past decade are the Oil Mineral
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC); both of which
were established by federal legislation.' OMPADEC was severely
criticized, leading to its disbandment. 8 While the NDDC has
received its share of scathing attacks, it still remains in existence.'
In addition to governmental efforts, the oil corporations
operating in Nigeria have instituted private financing initiatives to
develop their host communities. ° Oil corporations have embarked
on a number of community assistance and development projects
ranging from scholarships to construction of roads and buildings."
They have also started extending loans for micro-enterprises and
support for agricultural projects. 2 Corporate efforts have also
involved public-private partnerships with development agencies
including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID)."3
This article presents a critical appraisal of the public and
private initiatives to cushion the negative effects of oil and gas
production and ensure the development of these communities.
Although this work uses Nigeria as a framework for this
discussion, its ramifications and relevance extend beyond one
single country and may be beneficial to people in other resource-
rich countries.
This article is organized into seven parts including the
Introduction (Part I) and Conclusion (Part VII). Part II centers on
the social, economic and environmental impact of oil and gas
development in Nigeria's oil-producing communities. Part III
focuses on the public initiatives introduced to address the negative
6 See infra Part III.
7 See id.
8 Kybeyinje & Nezianya, supra note 4.
9 See infra Part III.D.
10 See infra Part IV.
" IId.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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effects of oil production. Of particular importance are the
practices under the now defunct OMPADEC, discussed in section
A of this part, and the nascent NDDC, discussed in section C.
Sections B and D of this part present a critical appraisal of the
public initiatives, concluding that OMPADEC was ineffective and
that the NDDC offers solutions with mixed results.
Part IV examines corporate approaches to community
development in the oil-producing communities of Nigeria. It
presents a general discussion of the various activities of the major
oil-producing companies in Nigeria. Particular attention is paid to
the approaches adopted by Royal Dutch/Shell and
ChevronTexaco. These two companies were selected because
they are two of the largest oil companies in Nigeria.14 They have
also had a long presence in Nigeria.15 Both of these factors
suggest they have had the opportunity and the capacity to either be
a huge blessing to, or inflict maximum damage on, the
environment and lives of people in these communities. In
addition, these two companies have been at the center of the
greatest controversies concerning oil production in Nigeria. Both
companies are currently the subjects of two separate lawsuits in
the United States regarding their operations in Nigeria.16  The
discussion here includes a detailed description and evaluation of
the corporate initiatives. Like the various public initiatives, this
article argues that the efforts of the oil companies have not been
very effective.
A number of factors account for the dismal performance of
public and private actors in Nigeria. The most prominent factors
appear to be the corruption present at all levels of Nigerian life and
the absence of meaningful participation of the public in the
14 See Nigeria: Government and Oil firms Should Act on Delta Violence, HUMAN
RIGHTS NEWS, at www.hrw.org/press/2003/04/nigeria0409.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2004).
15 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 249-52.
16 Shell was sued in New York and the lawsuit is still pending. See Wiwa v.
Royal/Dutch Shell, 226 F.3d 88 (2d. Cir. 2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001)
(holding that Nigerian 6migrrs' suit, brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, alleging
that Shell participated in human rights violations against them in retaliation for their
political opposition to its oil exploration activities in Nigeria should not be dismissed for
forum non conveniens). A lawsuit is also pending against Chevron in California. See
Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (2004) (holding that ChevronTexaco can face
trial in the U.S. for the alleged human rights abuses of its subsidiary in Nigeria).
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formulation and implementation of these policies and projects.17
Part V focuses on these two factors. To see tangible and enduring
improvements, there is a dire need to stamp out corruption or
minimize its influence. Public participation, which has gained
ascendancy in the international arena as an important component
of sustainable development, also deserves greater attention than is
presently the case in Nigeria. It is critical to ensure that
community members have a stake in these programs and are
allowed to take their destiny in their own hands. The challenge is
to design a framework for institutional arrangements that take
these factors into consideration.
Part VI looks at an example of an institutional arrangement:
community-based trust funds. Trust funds can be utilized at the
local level as financing mechanisms and management tools to
ensure the proper allocation and utilization of oil revenues and
enhance socio-economic development.18 Part VII concludes that
community-based trust funds could be a solution to ensure the
effective management of oil revenues in Nigerian oil-producing
communities. It is important to point out that this work focuses on
governmental and corporate financing initiatives for community
development. It does not address other options available to or
utilized by community members to seek redress for the negative
impact of oil production, such as tort litigation, political
negotiations, and extra-legal measures.
II. Economic, Environmental and Social Impact of Oil and
Gas Development in Nigeria
A. Economic Effects
Since at least the 1970s, the Nigerian economy has been
dominated by oil.' 9 Natural gas, a later entrant in the economic
equation, is fast becoming a major contributor to the Nigerian
economy.2 ° In 1966, the contribution of petroleum exploration and
17 See infra Part V.
18 See infra Part VI.
19 See Encyclopedia: Economy of Nigeria, at http://www.nationmaster.com/
encyclopedia/Economy-of-Nigeria (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
20 See LNG Boss Says Final Investment Decision On Train 6 Soon, VANGUARD
(Nigeria), May 14, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File; Norval Scott, Nigeria LNG
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production to total Nigerian GNP was 1.7% and the contribution
to GDP was 3.0%.21 In that same year, 33% of Nigeria's total
exports was crude oil which, although a significant increase from
the 0.8% in 1958, was not a majority of total exports.22 By the
early 1990s, the role of oil in the Nigerian economy was markedly
different. Petroleum production accounted for more than 90% of
foreign receipts, 70% of budgetary revenues, and 25% of the
GDP.23 Today, Nigeria produces over two million barrels of oil
per day. 4 This increase in production, coupled with the rising
price of crude oil, has resulted in a huge revenue stream for the oil
industry.
25
Despite this increase in revenue, the economic situation in
Nigeria presents a sad picture and the level of poverty is
astounding.26 Nigeria is an example of the resource curse in
action. Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian have
identified the salient features of the resource curse in Nigeria in
the following words:
Nigeria has been a disastrous development experience. On just
about every conceivable metric, Nigeria's performance since
independence has been dismal. In purchasing power parity
terms, Nigeria's per capita GDP was US$1,113 in 1970 and is
estimated to have remained at US$1,084 in 2000. The latter
figure places Nigeria amongst the 15 poorest nations in the
world for which such data is available. Nigeria, unfortunately,
fares much worse on measures of poverty and income
distribution. Between 1970 and 2000, the poverty rate,
measured as the share of the population subsisting on less than
US$1 per day increased from close to 36% to just under
70% .... This translates to an increase in the number of poor
Pays Large Dividend to Stakeholders, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Apr. 20, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News File.
21 SCOTT R. PEARSON, PETROLEUM AND THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 57 (1970).
22 L. H. SCHATZL, PETROLEUM IN NIGERIA 152-53 (1969).
23 SARAH AHMAD KHAN, NIGERIA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL 183 (1994).
24 Encyclopedia: Economy of Nigeria, supra note 19.
25 See Ike Okonta, Soul Of Ogoni Campaigner Marches On In Oil Killing Fields,
THE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENT, Nov. 7, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
File.
26 See generally Funmi Peter-Omale, Poverty Blamed On Policy Failure, THIS DAY
(Nigeria), May 3, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File.
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from about... 19 million in 1970 to a staggering... 90 million
in 2000 .... Similarly, the income distribution has deteriorated
very sharply. ... [W]hereas in 1970 the top 2% and the bottom
17% of the population earned the same total amount of income,
in 2000 the top 2% had the same income as the bottom 55%.27
While the national economy has received minimal benefits
from oil production, the economies of the oil-producing
communities have fared even worse. The local economies are
dominated by fishing and farming.28 Pollution and other sources
of environmental degradation have succeeded in ruining
significant aspects of these economies and in pushing community
members to destitution."
Crops are destroyed when oil leaks occur from high-pressure
pipelines.3" Oil leaks also adversely affect artificial fish ponds
used for fish farming, economically valuable trees, and other
income-generating assets.31 Even a small oil leak can wipe out a
family's annual income.
3 2
Pollution from oil production compels many members of oil-
producing communities to spend money on items they would have
27 Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the Natural Resource
Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria, NBER WORKING PAPERS 9804, 4 (June 2003),
available at www.nber.org/papers/w9804 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
28 According to the Federal Office of Statistics, farming and fishing activities
comprised 90% of all "forms of activity" in the Niger Delta. W.S. Owabukeruyele,
Hydrocarbon Exploitation, Environmental Degradation and Poverty in the Niger Delta
Region of Nigeria, at www.waado.org/Environment/PetrolPollution/EnvEconomics.htm
(last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
29 See Henry Clark et al., et al., Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations,
Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta, at http://www.
essentialaction.org/shell/Final-Report.pdf (Jan. 25, 2000).
30 See Owabukeruyele, supra note 28.
31 See Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Ambah, 3
N.W.L.R. 1, (Part 593, 1999). This case, which went to the Nigerian Supreme Court,
involved the destruction of the plaintiffs fish ponds, creeks, lakes and channels without
compensation from Shell. See Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, Compensation for Damage Arising
from Oil Operations: Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria v. Ambah
Revisited, INT'L ENERGY L. & TAX'N REV. 155 (2002); Olawale Animashaun,
Compensation for Damage Arising from Oil Operations: Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria v. Ambah Revisited - A Rejoinder, INT'L ENERGY L. & TAX'N REV.
164 (2002).
32 See Owabukeruyele, supra note 28.
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received nearly free of charge.33 For instance, in Eket, a town in
oil-producing Akwa-Ibom State,34 the operations of Exxon Mobil
have resulted in the loss of fish populations along the coast.35
Community members, unable to afford houseboat engines and
trawlers to venture into the high seas, are left with little option but
to buy fish from commercial fishermen.36 Therefore, not only
does the local population lose the earning potential of the fishing
industry, it also is forced to incur expenses that were not the norm
before the advent of oil production in the area.37
Community members are not protected by the Nigerian
Constitution38 or other federal legislation, including the Petroleum
Act, 39 that vest all mineral resources in the country in the federal
government.4 ° Additionally, the Land Use Act of 197841 limits the
level of compensation community members receive when oil is
discovered on their lands.42 It is hard to calculate the economic
benefits that community members would have received from the
land absent oil production and the extent of the resulting hardship
in the event of forced transfer of the property to the government.
33 See Clark et al., supra note 29.
34 Akwa-Ibom was created in 1987 in the southeast section of Nigeria. See Akwa-
Ibom State, at http://www.nigeria.gov/ng/states/akwaibom.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2004). This state spans about 4,350 square miles and its population approximates 2.5
million. Id. Eket is considered a city of "significant" size in Akwa-Ibom. Id.
35 See Clark et al., supra note 29.
36 Id.
37 Id. For an extensive discussion of the numerous negative effects of oil
production on oil communities in Nigeria, see IKEIN, supra note 3.
38 NIG. CONST, (1999), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOf
TheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm.
39 Petroleum Act, vol. XIX ch. 350 (1990) (Nig.).
40 Section 44(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution provides that "the entire
property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in under or upon any
land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic
Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in
such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly." NIG. CONST., ch. IV, §
44(3) (1999), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfrheFederal
RepublicOfNigeria.htm.
41 Land Use Act, vol. XI ch. 202 (1990) (Nig.).
42 Id.
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B. Environmental Impact of Oil Production
Another set of problems plaguing oil-producing communities
are the environmental consequences flowing from oil and gas
development.43 The Niger Delta area, which produces the bulk of
Nigeria's oil, is characterized by its rich biodiversity. 4  It is the
world's third largest wetland, after Holland and Mississippi.
45
While a number of environmental problems in the oil producing
communities are not necessarily attributable to oil production,
Nigeria's foray into this industry has been accompanied by
massive devastation of the environment in these communities.46
This has largely been due to gas flaring and oil spills.
47
Nigeria flares, or burns, more than 76% of gas associated with
oil.48 This is significant, considering that the worldwide average
of gas flares is 4%.49 Apart from the economically inefficient
nature of this practice (enormous revenues that would have
accrued from monetizing the gas are essentially forfeited), there
are huge environmental consequences.50  One of these
consequences is acid rain, which has stunted the growth of crops,
contaminated drinking water, and corroded the corrugated iron
roofing in these communities." During a visit of the Senate
Committee on the NDDC to oil-producing communities in his
43 See Clark et al., supra note 29.
44 See RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS, INNER NIGER DELTA FACT SHEET, at
www.ramsar.org/wwd2004_rpt-mali-press-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
45 See NIGER DELTA DEV. COMM'N, THE NIGER DELTA: A BRIEF HISTORY, at
http://www.nddeonline.org/TheNiger_Delta/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
46 See Bronwen Manby, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human
Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan.
1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/.
47 Id.
48 Abiodun Raufu, Nigerian Oil Workers & Families Rage Against Foreign
Companies: Citizen Leaders Say Compensation Must Cover Health Damage from Four
Decades of Gas Flaring, ECOTOPICS INT'L NEWS SERVICE, available at
http://www.ecotopics.com/articles/nigerian-oil.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
49 ENERGY SECTOR MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ESMAP), AFRICAN GAS
INITIATIVE: MAIN REPORT, UNDP/WoRLD BANK VOL. 1 (Feb. 2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ogmc/files/africagasinitiativemainreport.pdf.
50 Raufu, supra note 48.
51 Clark et al., supra note 29. The alternative to iron roofing is to use asbestos,
which is more expensive and less safe. Id.
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state, the deputy governor of Imo State, Mr. Ebere Udeagu, stated:
Gas flaring by oil companies in the oil producing communities
has terribly devastated a substantial portion of farm lands
leaving the streams polluted. These areas have been turned into
ghettos and swamps with the indigenes becoming destitute in
their fatherland. Their source of livelihood which is farming and
fishing have been closed as the streams have lost life in it, the
lands are no longer fertile.52
The flares, which bum twenty four hours a day, also serve to
deprive community members of the natural distinction between
night and day, and frustrate hunters by altering the lifestyles of
local wildlife. 3 Gas flaring also contributes to global warming."
The gas released during flares is predominantly methane, which
has more global warming potential than carbon dioxide.5
Another major source of environmental pollution in these
communities is the incidence of oil spills.56 Spills have become a
basic feature of life in the oil producing communities, occurring
from onsite leaks, pipeline ruptures, loading, offloading and
transportation of crude oil.57 Spills pollute creeks, ponds and
rivers, destroying sources of drinking water in communities that
generally lack alternative, portable sources of water, and killing
fish that people harvest for consumption and sale.58
In 1997, samples of water used for drinking and washing were
taken from Ogoniland 9 for analysis in the United States.6"
52 Eugenia Okpara, Imo Deputy Governor Laments Menace of Gas Flaring, DAILY
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2003), available at http://news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/
2003/nov/27/.
53 Clark et al., supra note 29.
54 Manby, supra note 46.
55 Id.
56 See Emeka Duruigbo, Oil Development in Nigeria: A Critical Investigation of
Chevron Corporation's Performance in the Niger River Delta, NATURAL HERITAGE
INSTITUTE (2001), available at www.n-h-i.org/Publications/Publications.html (last
visited Sept. 9, 2004).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 The Ogoni homeland is in Rivers State, a major oil-producing state. See Stephen
Messick, Homage To: The Ogoni, at www.treasurenc.com/sys-tmpl/
homagetotheogoni/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
60 Owabukeruyele, supra note 28.
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Interestingly, the water was taken from a portion of the
community that had been free from oil production for four years.61
Yet, despite the passage of time, results showed that the sample
contained a hydrocarbon level of 18 ppm (parts per million), 360
times higher than the amount permitted for drinking water in
Europe.62
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that clean up is hardly
undertaken on time, if at all.63 A recent CIA Report indicated that
the Niger Delta has suffered the equivalent of ten Alaskan Exxon
Valdez oil spills, yet there has been little clean up.64 Old, rusty
pipelines used beyond their intended lifetime also contribute to
causing and worsening this situation at the same time.65
C. Social Consequences of Petroleum Development
Apart from the economic and environmental impact of oil and
gas development discussed in the preceding sections, some social
problems have also been associated with oil. 66  The social
consequences of petroleum development have taken varied forms
in Nigeria. Some of the consequences are locally concentrated,
while others have a broader, national impact.67
1. Migration of Labor to Oil Producing Communities
One social problem accompanying oil production is the
migration of labor to oil producing areas and the exodus of
productive members from non-oil producing communities.68
Migration strains the local oil-producing communities' economies,
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See SUSTAINABLE ENERGY AND ECONOMY NETWORK, PROJECT PROFILE: NIGER
DELTA - SHELL OIL CONTRACTORS, available at http://www.seen.org/db/Dispatch?action-
ProjectWidget:580-detail=l (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
64 Id.
65 Clark et al., supra note 29.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See generally Eno Okoko, Women and Environmental Change in the Niger
Delta, Nigeria: Evidence from Ibeno, 6 J. GENDER PLACE & CLUTURE: J. FEMINIST GEOG.
373 (1999) (stating that in the non-oil producing community of Ibeno, the men are away
for all but one or two weeks of the year and farming activities typically completed by the
men are left uncompleted).
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leading to inflation and higher housing costs.69 Resentment also
brews when community members perceive the non-indigenes as
encroaching on their territories to take away their jobs.7" In
addition, some of the men that migrate to these communities leave
their families behind.71 This puts a strain on family life as wives,
often with little financial support, are saddled with the onerous
responsibility of raising the children.
7 2
2. Unemployment
With the destruction of traditional economies of fishing and
farming, unemployment is bound to rise. Community members
who have survived and thrived on this type of economy suddenly
find themselves without gainful employment and thus unable to
provide for the basic needs of their families.73 Young men and
women needing jobs look to the oil industry, but oil is an enclave
industry and only employs a few people with highly specialized
skills.74 Some community members lack these skills and even
those who have the requisite skills have not always been
successful in securing the well-paying oil industry jobs.75
3. Prostitution
Prostitution is another offshoot of petroleum development.76
Some young women who cannot find decent employment, or
whose families cannot afford the costs of higher education, resort
to selling their bodies to make ends meet.77 Some women, lured
by the false promise of easy money from the wealthy Nigerian and
expatriate oil workers, see sex work as a legitimate means of
reaping the benefits of oil production.78
69 See Eghosa E. Osaghae, The Ogoni Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation
and the Future of the Nigerian State, 94 AFR. AFF. 325 (1995).
70 Id.
71 Okoko, supra note 68, at 376.
72 Id.
73 Clark et al., supra note 29.
74 See IKE OKONTA & ORONTO DOUGLAS, WHERE VULTURES FEAST 29 (2001).
75 STEVE AZAIKI, INEQUITIES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS 150-52 (2003).
76 Clark et al., supra note 29.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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4. Social Conflict
Numerous social conflicts attributable to oil production have
become the norm in these communities.79 These conflicts take the
forms of intra-community battles, inter-community conflicts,
corporate-community conflicts, and community-government
conflicts.8" Community members resort to violence as a way of
airing their grievances. For example, in April 2004, two American
workers employed by a contractor to ChevronTexaco and five
Nigerians were killed while visiting a ChevronTexaco oil
production facility that had been abandoned in 2003 when armed
militants attacked their boat with heavy gunfire.8" Sometimes
violence is an attempt to capture part of the oil rents.82 While such
rent-seeking activity has taken the forms of peaceful protests and
demands, other times it has turned violent and resulted in deadly
consequences.83 Community members also seek to capture these
rents by rupturing pipelines transporting crude oil or scavenging
abandoned oil production facilities.84 While such efforts have met
with occasional success, they are fraught with immense danger
and have resulted in hundreds of deaths.85
79 See, e.g., Michelle Leighton & Elena Castaneda, Civil Society Concerns in the
Context of Economic Globalization, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW 105, 110 (2002).
80 See id.
81 See Mike Oduniyi & Josephine Lohor, Niger Delta: Chevron Suspends
Production, THIS DAY, Apr. 26, 2004, available at www.thisdayonline.com; Louis
Odion, Warri: The Making of a Middle East, THE SUN (Nig.), May 2, 2004.
82 Oil rents are used here to denote unearned income that accrues by reason of the
state's monopoly power. For a discussion ofoil rents, rentier states and rent-seeking, see
H. Mahdavy, The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States:
The Case oflran, in STUDIES IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 428 (M.A.
Cook, ed., 1970). See also Terry Lynn Karl, Oil-led Development: Social, Political and
Economic Consequences, 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 666 (Cutler J. Cleveland ed.
2004); Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of a Rent-Seeking Society, 3 AM.
ECON. REV. 291 (1974), available at http://www.jstor.org.
83 The violence could either emanate from community members or result from the
reaction of the oil corporations and government security forces. Leighton & Castaneda,
supra note 79, at 110.
84 See Nigerian Oil Explosion: 15 Dead, Agence France Press, (May 19, 2004), at
http://www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1 529386,00.html.
85 See Nigeria Digs Mass Grave for Pipeline Victims (Oct. 19, 1998), at
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9810/19/nigeria.explosion.05/.
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5. Human Rights Abuses
Members of oil producing communities have also suffered
numerous human rights abuses.86 From infringement of their
social and economic rights, including deprivation of property
rights when oil is located on their land, to infractions of their civil
and political rights when military or police repression is used to
break up their protests, the unfair plight of these communities can
hardly be overstated.87
In order to address the economic, environmental, and social
problems that have become the norm in the oil-producing
communities, the Nigerian government has introduced a number
of initiatives over the years.88 Two prominent initiatives are
discussed in the following section.
III. Public Initiatives to Address the Negative Impact of Oil
Development
In the past decade, the government of Nigeria introduced two
influential and controversial initiatives to cater to the needs of oil-
producing communities and provide relief from the problems
confronting them. These initiatives were OMPADEC8 9 and the
NDDC. 90
A. Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission
(OMPADEC)
OMPADEC was established by the administration of General
Ibrahim Babangida in 1992 to assuage the restlessness in the oil
producing areas.91 The government instituted the commission to
86 See Oil Companies Complicit in Nigerian Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb.
23, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/l999/feb/nig0223.htm.
87 Id.; Corporations and Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 23, 1999),
available at http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/corporations/nige-update.htm.
88 See, e.g., OIL MINERAL PRODUCING AREAS DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, OIL
MINERAL PRODUCING AREAS DEV. COMM'N DECREE (July 9, 1992) [hereinafter
OMPADEC DECREE], available at http://www.law.pace.edu/env/nigerian
law/oilprod/oil.html; NDDC ACT, at www.nddconline.org/TheNDDCAct.shtml.
89 OMPADEC DECREE, supra note 88.
90 NDDC ACT, at www.nddconline.org/TheNDDCAct.shtml [hereinafter NDDC
ACT].
91 See Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic
Reconciliation in the New Century, 14 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 327, 346 (2000) (noting
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placate the people by giving the impression that it was concerned
with improving their plight.92 After increasing the financial
allocation that the federal government makes to oil-producing
areas from 1.5 to 3% of revenues derived from upstream
activities,93 the Babangida administration established OMPADEC
with a mandate to more evenly and fairly distribute the
allocation.94
OMPADEC's primary assignment was to propose and execute
development projects in oil and mineral producing communities
with the consent of the President.95  Its mandate included
addressing problems pertaining to infrastructure, jobs, education,
and environment in the oil mineral producing areas.96 OMPADEC
was charged with the responsibility of "tackling ecological
problems that have arisen from the exploration of oil minerals,
[consulting] with the relevant Federal and State Government
authorities on the control and effective methods of tackling the
problem of oil pollution and spillages, [and] liaising with the
various oil companies on matters of pollution control."97
During its existence, OMPADEC embarked on a number of
developmental projects including road and school construction,
electricity projects, and purified water provision.98 Some of these
projects were abandoned, with the approval of OMPADEC, after
contractors received payments. 99
that OMPADEC was "meant to be a more substantive concession" to the demands and
the anti-oil protests of oil-producing minorities).
92 Ezetah, supra note 1, at 819.
93 See Ike Oguine, Nigeria 's Oil Revenues and the Oil Producing Areas, 4 CTR.
ENERGY, PETROLEUM & MINERAL L. & POL'Y ONLINE J. (Jan. - May, 1999), at
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/joumal/html/vol4/article4-1O.html. Upstream activities
refer to those aspects of the industry dealing with exploration and production. Id. The
other component of the industry is the downstream sector, which consists of refining,
marketing, sales and distribution. Id. For a discussion of the structure of the oil
industry, see generally PAUL FRANKEL, THE ESSENTIALS OF PETROLEUM, pt. 4 (1969), and
Edward L. Morse, A New Political Economy of Oil?, 53 J. INT'L AFF. 1 (1999).
94 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 49.
95 Osaghae, supra note 69, at 332.
96 OMPADEC DECREE supra note 88, § 2(1).
97 Id.
98 Osaghae, supra note 69, at 332.
99 See OKONTA & DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 34-35.
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B. Evaluation of OMPADEC
OMPADEC provided a number of benefits such as the
provision of electricity and clean water to some of the target
communities.' While it met with success in these fields, the
Commission failed miserably on a number of other fronts. In the
environmental arena, OMPADEC did virtually nothing.' This
has been explained as the result of the overwhelming demands for
development projects confronting the Commission." 2
Another rationale offered for OMPADEC's relative inaction
on environmental issues is that OMPADEC was not properly
equipped to carry out its environmental responsibilities.'0 3 It was
not empowered to make regulations, enforce laws, or impose
sanctions for breach of environmental laws. 4 These limitations
may have adversely affected OMPADEC's ability to discharge its
duties. These limitations, however, do not excuse ineptitude. If
OMPADEC wanted to develop and implement directives to
improve the environment, it is unlikely that there would have been
many legal impediments to prevent it from doing so.0 5
Furthermore, if OMPADEC sought to carry out its environmental
mandate and was hamstrung by a lack of enforcement capacity, it
would then be obvious that the limitations in the law constituted
an obstacle. 106 This would lay a legitimate foundation for future
legislative reform. Unfortunately, there is hardly anything to
indicate that OMPADEC even got to this point.'0 7
Indeed, it is doubtful that OMPADEC perceived itself to be
100 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 49.
101 See Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of
Transnational Corporations, and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 261, 287 (1997).
102 Oguine, supra note 93 (stating "[t]his clamour for development projects was so
great that OMPADEC's other major function of tackling ecological problems was all but
forgotten").
103 See Eaton, supra note 101, at 289.
104 Id.
105 Kaniye S.A. Ebeku, Critical Appraisal of Nigeria's Niger Delta Development
Act 2000, INT'L ENERGY L. & TAx'N REV. 203, 203 (2003).
106 Eaton, supra note 101, at 288.
107 Id. at 288.
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weak. 1°8 Afterall, this is a commission that at one point blatantly
ignored a properly procured court order.'0 9 When the Federal
High Court in Benin City issued an order restraining OMPADEC
from swearing in Joseph Popo as the new commissioner for Delta
state, OMPADEC defied the court order and proceeded with the
swearing in.'10
OMPADEC's structure also constituted an impediment. The
Commission's budget was controlled by the Head of State, which
may have affected its independence and flexibility in the discharge
of its duties."' There might have been good reason for keeping a
leash on the Commission through the controls afforded by the
budgetary process, but if that was the intent, it does not appear to
have worked. OMPADEC operated without any credible financial
oversight; its work was marred by gross mismanagement of funds
and corruption.112 OMPADEC's chairman, Albert K. Horsfall,
was removed following an investigation launched by the Nigerian
government and replaced by a sole administrator, Professor Eric
Agume Opia. 113 Eventually, when Opia could not account for
approximately $200 million belonging to OMPADEC, he was also
removed. "4  Opia eventually "disappeared" with a cloud of
suspicion and allegations of corruption surrounding and trailing
him. 15
Even though OMPADEC's budget was controlled by the Head
of State, the Commission's poor performance is actually traceable
to "the absence of performance guidelines or controls," leading it
to embark on projects without restriction." 6 This opened the door
to inefficiency and corruption. One such project was the financing
of the Eleme Gas Turbine in Port Harcourt, Rivers State in
108 OKONTA & DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 33.
109 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 124.
110 Id.
111 OKONTA & DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 33.
112 See id. (noting that although OMPADEC had a budget of approximately $95
million in 1993, money was dispersed to it at the Head of State's whim, making proper
project planning simply impossible).
113 Id. at 35.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
[Vol. 30
MANAGING OIL REVENUES
1993."' At the end of 1995, the project had still not been
completed and if it was to be completed, it would require the
infusion of additional funds by OMPADEC." 8
With Opia's removal, OMPADEC underwent a restructuring
and Vice Admiral Dan Preston Omatsola was appointed as the
Chairman.'19 The major feature of the restructuring was the
decentralization of the Commission's operations through the
establishment of zonal offices in proximity to the oil producing
areas. 2 ' This did not appear to have solved all the problems,
though, and was criticized as creating additional levels of
bureaucracy that "translate to new opportunities for corruption and
waste and new theatres of conflict over contracts and jobs."12'
Another barrier to OMPADEC's success was the absence of a
meaningful opportunity for community members to participate in
the development process. Critics believe that OMPADEC should
have been structured in such a way as to allow "local communities
to take charge of their own affairs" with as little direct interference
as possible.'22
At the end of the day, OMPADEC proved an ineffective and
inefficient institution. It did little to "channel resources to the oil
producing areas [and provided a clear example of] the use of
public oil revenues for the benefit of specific individuals at the
expense of village communities affected by oil operations on the
ground.'
'1 23
C. Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)
Shortly after assuming the reins of office in May 1999,
Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo commenced efforts to
address the complaints of the people in the oil-producing
117 Id. at 34.
118 Id. at 34-35.
119 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 50.
120 Oguine, supra note 93.
121 Id.
122 See Dr. Ibibia Lucky Worika, Deprivation, Despoliation and Destitution:
Whither Environment and Human Rights in Nigeria's Niger Delta?, 8 ILSA J. INT'L &
COmp. L. 1, 27 n.77 (2001).
123 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 50.
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communities of Nigeria.'24 Mr. Obasanjo introduced a bill to the
National Assembly in 1999 which, after some legislative tinkering,
became the Niger Delta Development Commission Act in 2000.125
The Act established the NDDC to replace OMPADEC.1
26
As replacement legislation for the OMPADEC Decree, the
NDDC Act was designed to avoid the pitfalls of the precursor
legislation. 127 The NDDC was established as a "new Commission
with a re-organized management and administrative structure for
more effectiveness" in addressing the negative effects of oil
exploration. 128  This is obviously a tacit acknowledgment that
OMPADEC was not as effective as it should have been.
The NDDC Act adopted an expansive definition of the Niger
Delta Area to include the nine oil-producing states of Abia, Akwa-
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers. 2 9
Each of these states is represented in the nineteen-member
Governing Board of the NDDC. 3 °  The remainder of the
Governing Board's composition, under the NDDC Act, consists of
the following: a Chairman, three members representing the non-oil
producing states of the country drawn from the three geo-political
zones of the North East, North Central, and North West; a
representative of the oil corporations operating in the Niger Delta;
a representative of each of the federal ministries of Finance and
Environment, a managing director, and two executive directors.1
31
Unlike the other members of the Board, the three directors serve
on a full-time basis.132
Ostensibly to ensure a closer connection between the oil-
producing communities and the Commission, the NDDC Act
provides that most of the state representatives on the NDDC
124 Ebeku, supra note 105, at 203.
125 NDDC ACT, supra note 90.
126 Id.
127 Ebeku, supra note 105, at 203.
128 NDDC ACT, supra note 90, at pmbl.
129 NDDC ACT, supra note 90. For the different definitions of "Niger Delta"
including the restrictive and expansive ones, see AZAIKI, supra note 75, at 142.
130 NDDC ACT, supra note 90, § 2(1).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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Governing Board must come from an oil-producing community.133
Similarly, the three directors (managing and executive) are also to
be selected from oil-producing areas.134
The President enjoys broad powers of appointment. He
appoints the Chairman and members of the NDDC Board.'35
Apart from the oil companies' representative, who is nominated by
the companies and forwarded to the President,1 6 the rest of the
members are directly appointed by the President. 137  All of the
appointments, however, are subject to confirmation by the Senate,
following consultation with the House of Representatives.38
Members of the Board are appointed for a term of four years,
which is renewable for an additional term.'39 The Chairmanship
rotates among the Member States, in alphabetical order. 4 °
In addition to the Governing Board, the Act also establishes a
Management Committee consisting of the Managing Director, two
executive directors, and the directors in charge of the
Commission's eleven directorates. 141
Monitoring of the activities of the Commission is primarily
entrusted to the care of two entities. The first entity is the
Advisory Committee whose membership includes the governors of
the Member States and two other persons appointed by the
President.'42 The other entity is the Monitoring Committee which
is charged with monitoring the implementation of projects and
managing the funds of the Commission.' Members of the
Committee are appointed by the President from the national civil
133 Id.
134 Id. § 12(1).
135 Id. § 2(2).
136 Id. § 2(l).
137 Id. § 2(2).
138 Id.
139 Id. § 3(1).
140 Id.
141 Id. § 10. The Directorates are: administration, community development, utilities
development and waterways, environmental protection, finance, agriculture, planning
and research, legal services, education and health, commercial and industrial
development, and projects monitoring. Id. § 9(1).
142 Id. § 11(1).
143 Id. § 21(2).
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service core. 44
The mandate of the NDDC, similar to that of OMPADEC,
includes the following: the formulation of policies and guidelines
for the development of the Niger Delta area; the conception,
planning, and implementation of projects and programs for the
sustainable development of the area in the fields of transportation
(including roads, jetties, and waterways), health, education,
employment, industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing
and urban development, water supply, electricity, and
telecommunications, and the handling of ecological and
environmental problems that are the consequence of oil
exploration in the area. 45
The NDDC Act also contains provisions on the sources of the
Commission's funds.14 6 The federal government is the major
contributor while additional contributions come from the oil-
producing states and the Ecological Fund.'47 The oil corporations
operating in the Niger Delta are also required to contribute 3% of
their annual budget to the Commission.'48 In March 2004, it was
reported that the oil companies had not fully lived up to their
financial responsibilities. 149  All the oil companies, foreign and
indigenous,' so far have either short-changed the NDDC or
defaulted in making their contributions."' In some cases, the
companies attribute their lower contribution to deductions for
community development activities and for the cost of their
participation in the Liquefied Natural Gas Project, although the
144 Id. § 2(2).
145 Id. § 7(1).
146 Id. § 14.
147 Id. The Ecological Fund is a fund set aside by the government to mitigate
environmental degradation. FINANCIAL INFORMATION ENGINE ON LAND DEGRADATION
(FIELD), ECOLOGICAL FUND (Jun. 2003), available at http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/
Countries/Nigeria/FR_EF.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). Funds have been released in
the past to finance desertification and drought-relief projects. Id.
148 Id.
149 See Jide Ajani, How Oil Companies Short Change the NDDC, VANGUARD, Mar.
19, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File.
150 See Uchenna Awom, Oil Firms Ordered to Pay N58 Billion, DAILY
INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Feb. 19, 2004, at http://www.dailyindependentng.com.
151 See Ajani, supra note 149.
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law creating the NDDC says nothing about these deductions. 15 2
Since its commencing operations, the NDDC has developed an
"interim action plan" which includes the construction of roads,
health and educational facilities, shore protection, and building of
jetties.153 Communities are consulted and allowed to suggest
proposals regarding the projects to be sited in their areas. 154
Contracts are generally executed by members of the beneficiary
communities.155 The interim action plan also has a human
development component that incorporates skill development
programs for the youth in the oil-producing areas.156 The object is
to steer the attention of the youth away from violent tendencies
and toward productive community involvement. 157 Upon
completion of their training, the NDDC plans to support the youth
in building an entrepreneurial base by providing them with micro-
credit advances.158 The human development scheme also includes
free medical programs to be run in conjunction with health and
charitable medical organizations.' 59  The NDDC has also
developed a master plan, an undertaking that took about three
years, which addresses the Commission's long term goals in the
Niger Delta. 16
0
The NDDC views itself as a dramatic departure from
OMPADEC and other previous attempts to address the needs of
the people of the Niger Delta. According to the NDDC Chairman,
Mr. Onyema Ugochukwu, agencies such as OMPADEC and the
152 Id. The Liquiefied Natural Gas Project is a natural gas processing facility in
Finima, Rivers State. VIATON, LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS PROJECT, at http://www.
nigerianoil-gas.com/naturalgas/liquefiednatural-gas-project.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2004).
153 See My Plan for Niger Delta, NEWSWATCH (Nig.), Mar. 3, 2003, at 15
[hereinafter NEWSWATCH Interview].
154 Id.
155 Id. at 16-17.
156 Id. at 15.
157 See Joseph Winter, Nigeria's Elections in the South, BBC DELTA REGION, Apr.
15, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/2949809.stm (last
visited Sep. 10, 2004).
158 NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153, at 15.
159 Id. at 16.
160 See Godwin Haruna, Redressing the Inequities of a People, THIS DAY (Nig.),
Apr. 21, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File.
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Niger Delta Development Board of 1962 were intervention
agencies, which adopted a crisis management approach. 6 ' The
crisis management approach is similar to the NDDC's interim
action plan, which is a small component of the NDDC's intended
objectives. 162 The NDDC's master plan is a major point of
divergence.1 63  The NDDC also professes to differ from
OMPADEC because, unlike its predecessor, it has adopted a
bottom-up approach to community development. 164 An additional
point of departure is that the NDDC promotes partnerships with
other agencies with the similar goal of developing these
communities."' Ugochukwu puts it in the following words:
[The NDDC] believes that unless the people own the process of
their development then there is no way anybody can sustain it.
That is why we want their involvement. The people must be in
the driving seat of their own development. So our own
[approach] is to involve them right from conception, design and
implementation. And that is the only way you can sustain any
development plan. If the people don't own it, they can't sustain
it. The other departure point for us arises from the act itself.
The NDDC is conceived as a partnership. A partnership of
various agencies and stakeholders who will unite in developing
this place .... We have made a great effort to forge a
partnership with all the agencies. We go on very well with
several of the state governments, with the oil companies, with
the World Bank, the UNDP. They want to be our partners in
providing certain services in the area. I believe the United
States will also participate.1
66
The NDDC is still in its infancy and only time will reveal the
extent to which this new institution differs from its predecessors
and how far it will go in tackling the serious problems confronting
the oil-producing communities in Nigeria. Nevertheless, there is
some basis for evaluating its work so far.
161 NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153, at 16.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
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D. Evaluation of the NDDC
The creation of the NDDC, like that of its predecessor
OMPADEC,167 was mired in controversy. Oil-producing states
and communities raised objections either to its very existence or to
some aspects of it with which they were not comfortable.168
Nevertheless, the NDDC entered the stage with the intention of
avoiding some of the criticisms leveled against OMPADEC.' 69
For instance, OMPADEC was criticized because it did not
require members of the Commission's Board to be selected from
oil-producing communities.17 In response, the NDDC Act
introduced this requirement, but it has not been fully or faithfully
followed. 71 The current Chairman of the Board, Mr. Onyema
Ugochukwu, a close associate of President Obasanjo, is not from
an oil-producing community in his native Abia state."' Mr.
Obasanjo, whom Mr. Ugochukwu served as a Senior Special
Assistant before the appointment, insisted on his confirmation by
the Senate. 73 Despite the flagrant violation of the NDDC Act's
provisions, President Obasanjo eventually prevailed.'74
The NDDC is viewed by some scholars and community
members as only marginally better than OMPADEC. One
commentator scathingly remarked that the "NDDC is hardly
different from OMPADEC apart from its name.""17 Perhaps this is
a harsh assessment, but there are valid reasons why the NDDC has
come under a barrage of criticisms.
One reason is the absence of clear provisions in the NDDC Act
167 Oguine, supra note 93.
168 See Scott Dolezal, The Systematic Failure to Interpret Article IV of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is There a Public Emergency in
Nigeria?, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1163, 1207 (2000) (stating that the "[f]undamental
weaknesses in the [NDDC] bill initially led officials from every state in the Delta to
unanimously oppose the creation of the NDDC").
169 Ebeku, supra note 105, at 203.
170 Oguine, supra note 93.
171 NDDC ACT § 2(2), at www.nddconline.org/TheNDDCAct.shtml.
172 See Emeka Chianu, NDDC - Another Shot at Infrastructural Development of
Nigeria's Oil Producing Areas, INT'L ENERGY L. & TAX'N REv. 214, 215 (2001).
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 Ebeku, supra note 105, at 204.
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mandating the Commission to remediate and compensate for past
oil operations damage.'76 This is seen as a factor that could
hamper the Commission's progress.'77 However, though there are
no specific provisions conferring such a duty, the NDDC may still
be able to fit such an assignment into its broader mandate. A
critical question, however, is whether this is the kind of matter
with which the NDDC should be concerned. Arguably, it may be
better for the federal and state governments to address
'remediation issues' through the environmental protection
agencies, since they are more likely to be equipped (in terms of
staffing and funding) for such a task. Additionally, compensation
issues could be addressed under separate arrangements involving
the various stakeholders.
Part of the criticisms against the NDDC stem from the fact that
the NDDC is not required to allocate projects in proportion to the
volume of oil revenue accrued by each state.'78 A similar situation
occurred in the context of OMPADEC under which shares of
development projects were determined in proportion to a
community's current volume of oil production; that arrangement
has been criticized, though. 7 9 Adhering to such a formula
promotes some level of inequity in the process, since some of
today's minor oil-producing communities were among the leading,
if not dominant, producers in the past. 8 ° It may be unfair to treat
them as minor players today when the country relied on their
resources all these years without much appreciation or
compensation for losses suffered.' 8'
176 Id. at 204 n. 18.
177 Id.
178 Dolezal, supra note 168, at 1207.
179 Eghosa Esoghae, Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided
Society: the Nigerian Experience, 36 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 1, 23 (1998).
180 Id. (citing the example of Oloibiri, the pioneer oil-producing community
in Nigeria, which no longer has larger reserves of oil).
181 See Chianu, supra note 172, at 217. Until the establishment of OMPADEC, the
government paid little attention to oil-producing communities. See Augustine Ikelegbe,
Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of
Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle, 39 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 437, 437 (2001).
Thus, communities that produced oil pre-OMPADEC generally provided a considerable
portion of the country's revenue and bore the brunt of oil production with hardly any
compensation. Id.
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The NDDC Act is also assailed because of the provision that
the President is occasionally empowered to give binding directives
to the Commission.1 2 This is considered unnecessary because
"whatever directives and priorities [the President] may wish for
the Commission can be stipulated when the Commission's budget
is passed through him to the National Assembly."' 83
The NDDC structure is also subject to severe strictures
because its budgetary process is placed under the control of the
National Assembly.'84 The annual budget of the Commission must
be approved by the federal legislative body.'85 This kind of over
centralization may not be helpful in the end. The budget approval
process invites lobbying of legislators with the attendant
opportunity for corruption and rent seeking.'86
A major problem with the NDDC is that it is not insulated
from partisan politics. In an interview with a national magazine in
Nigeria, NDDC Chairman Ugochukwu expressed his strong desire
to work for Mr. Obasanjo's re-nomination and re-election.'87 He
makes his political leanings clear and one wonders to what extent
party loyalties affect the carrying out of his or the Commission's
functions. A development agency like the NDDC should be
thoroughly de-politicized. It is likely to perform better as an
apolitical body run by people who have no overt political
affiliations or interests.
One scholar catalogs additional criticisms against the
development institution, covering a variety of factors:
The greatest problem relates to the Commission's composition.
Moreover, the Act lacks other appropriate and necessary
participatory provisions. Specifically, the NDDC Act does not
make provision for the representation of the indigenous people
(for whose benefit the Act was made) in the executing body nor
182 NDDC ACT § 23, at www.nddconline.org/TheNDDCAct.shtml.
183 Chianu, supra note 172, at 217.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See id.
187 See NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153, at 20 (quoting Ugochukwu as
stating "[flor me the main objective was, I work for the president, to contribute to his re-
nomination and re-election.., we had to put aside our egos or any other considerations
and join in the reconciliation to ensure that most Abia votes will go to the president").
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is there a provision for their participation in the planning and
execution of projects. The provision for the representation of
state members in the Commission cannot be properly regarded
as affording representation to the local people, since they have
no input in the process of appointment. The problem with this
situation lies in the fact that such appointees are likely to see
themselves as representing the state authorities that appointed
them, and not the people. Moreover, they may be persons who
are unfamiliar with the problems and needs of the local
people.188
Regarding the specific issue of composition, the structure of
the NDDC, like OMPADEC before it, does not permit
communities to have true representation in the body. While it is
true that community members are represented in the Commission,
the reality is that one representative from one community cannot
represent the interests of a myriad of diverse communities.'89 It is
hard to believe that these communities see such representation as
holding much significance for them.
Yet, the issue of active participation remains of great
importance to community members. 9 ° Chizor Wisdom Dike,
former president of Ogbogu, an oil-producing community in
Rivers State, Development Association and currently Executive
Director of Community Rights Initiative, a social and economic
rights non-governmental organization in Rivers State, commented:
The basic issue about [the] NDDC is that decision-making
about projects for communities is centralised, bureaucratic,
clumsy and elitist. There is an absolute lack of community
involvement in the choice of projects according to actual
community needs. The state offices of the NDDC are not
functional. They do not have the power to discuss or
award contracts. Project monitoring and evaluation is done
without the participation of communities. The amount of
money accruing to the NDDC vis-A-vis the
188 Ebeku, supra note 105, at 204.
189 The NDDC Act provides that a member state will be represented by a
representative of an oil-producing community. NDDC ACT § 2(1), at www.
nddconline.org/TheNDDCAct.shtml. Since there are usually many oil-producing
communities in a particular state, only one of these communities will be truly
represented because the Commissioner can only hail from one of the communities.
190 See Worika, supra note 122, at 27 n. 77.
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projects and programmes on the ground shows non-
performance. Since 2000, over 60 Billion Naira was
released to the commission with very little to show for it.
The NDDC has not performed to public expectation.
191
In addition, there are still concerns that the NDDC is not
immune from the specter of corruption that plagued its
predecessor, OMPADEC. 192 There have already been allegations
that up to 300 million Naira, approximately USD$3 million, was
taken from the coffers of the NDDC to support a campaign against
President Obasanjo's political opponents.'93
Finally, whether it is OMPADEC or the NDDC, it is
instructive to note that despite the rhetoric, 194 the government
seems to favor a top-down approach with the President and
national institutions controlling virtually every aspect of the
Commission's work from appointments to execution of its
responsibilities and monitoring of its activities.'95 This article
argues for a truly bottom-up approach, where people in the local
communities play a bigger role in how development activities are
carried out.
Commenting on the government developmental measures,
ChevronTexaco expressed the view that "[m]any lessons learned
from OMPADEC can [be] and are being avoided by [the]
NDDC."' 96 In its assessment of the performance of the NDDC,
the company adds: "When compared with OMPADEC, [the]
NDDC's performance is encouraging, still there is much to be
191 E-mail from Chizor Wisdom Dike to Emeka Duruigbo (May 1, 2004) (on file
with author). Mr. Dike and the present author, through the Natural Heritage Institute,
have been designing a framework for managing oil revenues in Nigeria. A major
alternative being considered by the work is the trust fund initiative.
192 See Ebeku, supra note 105, at 204 n. 25 (stating that "[alIready the NDDC...
has been criticised as another aloof government agency and another cocoon for official
corruption").
193 Tony Eluemunor, Obaseki's Sack to Expose Shady Deals in NNPC, DAILY
INDEPENDENT ONLINE (Nig.), Nov. 9, 2003, at http://www.dailyindependentng.com.
194 For instance, the NDDC Chairman, Mr. Onyema Ugochukwu, has stated that the
NDDC adopts a bottom-up approach. See NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153.
195 See Chianu, supra note 172, at 215-17 (discussing the enormous powers of
control and supervision enjoyed by the federal government and government-controlled
bodies).
196 ChevronTexaco Nigeria, Response to the Present Researcher's Questionnaire,
Apr. 2004 [hereinafter ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions].
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desired. The issues around the Niger Delta are overly politicized.
This tends to hamper genuine improvements. 19"
When asked to assess the NDDC, Shell only gives it a fair
grade at this point.198 According to a company representative, "[i]t
is still early to judge their performance, but there has to be
separation of their process from influence of government and
politics. Transparency and process alignment with what obtains in
the industry are factors that will enhance success."' 99
A harsher assessment has come from the architect of the
NDDC himself, President Olusegun Obasanjo. During a meeting
with youth leaders in the Niger Delta at which the NDDC
Chairman received less than favorable treatment from the youth,
President Obasanjo was constrained to observe that "the youths
were disenchanted with the NDDC."2 °° He "pointed out that he
too was not particularly pleased with the NDDC."' O' With this
assessment, the need for a re-examination of the role of the NDDC
cannot be overemphasized.
IV. Private Initiatives: Case Studies
In addition to the public initiatives discussed above, there have
also been private corporate initiatives to contribute to community
development. The corporate approaches have varied from direct
funding arrangements to community grants. Recently, there has
been interest in both contracts with credible non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and public-private partnerships with
development agencies such as USAID and UNDP. °2 This Part of
the article presents case studies on Chevron and Shell as well as
general commentary on other oil corporations operating in Nigeria
in relation to their community development activities.
197 Id.
198 See Shell Nigeria, Response to the Present Researcher's Questionnaire, Apr.
2004 [hereinafter Shell Nigeria, Response to Questions].
199 Id.
200 Hector Igbikiowubo, Benin River Attack: Nigeria's Unfolding Oil E&P Tragedy,
VANGUARD (Nig.), May 5, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., infra notes 253-60 and accompanying text.
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A. ChevronTexaco
ChevronTexaco was formed in 2001 with the merger of two
major oil companies, California-based Chevron and Texas-based
Texaco. °3 Before the merger, both companies had been operating
in Nigeria either independently or in partnership with the Nigerian
government under joint ventures or through production sharing
contracts.20 4 ChevronTexaco's affiliates have had operations in
Nigeria for over forty years.20 5 Chevron (then Gulf) discovered
the Okan oil field in 1964, this was the first commercial field
discovered on Nigeria's continental shelf.206 The field began oil
production in 1965.207 One of the company's major operating
facilities is the Escravos oil terminal in Warri, Delta State, which
is operated by Chevron Nigeria Limited in partnership with the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). 208  This
terminal processes approximately 480,000 barrels of oil a day.20 9
Most of ChevronTexaco's operations in Nigeria are offshore with
less than 30% of the operations onshore.210
ChevronTexaco explains its philosophy regarding community
development this way:
[I]n many of the communities where we operate, poverty
persists and multinational corporations such as ChevronTexaco
increasingly are being called upon to fill roles that have
traditionally been the domain of government, such as providing
health care, education and basic infrastructure. We believe that
as a private-sector company we cannot, and should not, take on
the role of government. But we believe we can make many
meaningful contributions to improving the quality of life in the
203 Robert Evans, ChevronTexaco Corp. - 10K, in MD&A WORKSHOP 2002: WHAT
EVERY LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT MD&A DISCLOSURE 945, 947 (Practicing
Law Institute, 2002).
204 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 11.
205 CHEVRONTEXACO, 2002 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT:
INTEGRITY AND LEARNING IN AN EVOLVING WORLD 10 (2003), available at
http://www.chevrontexaco.com/cr-report/download-report.asp, [hereinafter CHEVRON
TEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT].
206 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 12.
207 Id.
208 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 10.
209 Id.
210 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
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communities where we operate and are focusing our resources
toward helping to address these issues.21'
ChevronTexaco asserts that governments should not abdicate
their traditional roles or transfer them to oil corporations.
ChevronTexaco believes that a company should contribute to
community development, but only to a limited extent.
ChevronTexaco declares that it recognizes the need to be
"cognizant" of how it "manage[s] the social, economic and
environmental impacts of [its] operations."'2 12 A former Columbia
University anthropologist that ChevronTexaco hired to assist in
redesigning its community development strategy noted:
In my view, this area [Nigeria's Niger Delta] presents one of the
most difficult social environments in the world, especially after
thirty seven [sic] years of military government. Traditional
economies and social organizations have been severely
damaged, leaving the area with no way to make consensus
decisions or resolve conflict. Meanwhile, anger is growing
among local villagers, who feel they have received few benefits
from either oil companies or the government.213
In carrying out its community development activities in
Nigeria, ChevronTexaco employs a mix of direct funding,
contracts with NGOs, sometimes called "voluntary development
agencies," and public-private partnerships.214 ChevronTexaco
does not make direct monetary grants to communities, except in
the cases of land or property acquisition and compensation for oil
pollution damage.215 The company contributes to community
development through sponsorship of educational and health
programs such as scholarships, building and equipping science
laboratories, renovating dilapidated structures, incentivising the
teaching of the English language and the sciences in the remote,
rural areas by paying stipends to teachers, building classrooms and
residences for teachers, hospitals and river boats, and "donation as
well as construction of infrastructure of various other kinds. 216
211 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 14.
212 Id. at 5.
213 Id. at 10.
214 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
215 Id.
216 Id.
[Vol. 30
MANAGING OIL REVENUES
ChevronTexaco states that it spends between $55 million and $63
million on community investments worldwide annually.217  In
2002, the company reportedly spent $62.8 million.218 In Nigeria,
Chevron Nigeria Limited is said to have spent more than $90
million so far on community development, and this has gone
toward the provision of water, power, roads, canals, jetties,
schools, and hospitals.
219
In carrying out its community development activities in
Nigeria, the company does not pay money directly to communities
as grants for the construction of projects.22 ° Instead, contracts are
awarded to the lowest bidder or to a community contractor if he or
she submits a bid that is within 10% of the lowest bid.221 With
regard to micro-enterprise development, the company utilizes the
services of NGOs that have "a track record and expertise in rural
development. '22  The decision to work through these agencies,
according to ChevronTexaco, was informed by "years of
unsatisfactory performance" when the company tried to carry out
some of these activities itself.2 3  ChevronTexaco's focus is
beginning to gravitate toward micro enterprise development and
away from infrastructure building (brick and mortar) because
much of the infrastructure erected by the company "has been
burned by rival ethnic groups during frequent inter-ethnic
clashes. 224
In addition, ChevronTexaco has also embarked upon public-
private partnerships. 25 In particular, the company formed a
partnership with UNDP in Nigeria.226 In its 2002 Corporate
217 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 14.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 10.
220 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 16.
For an exhaustive and critical evaluation of public-private partnerships, especially those
involving the United Nations, see ANN ZAMMITT, DEVELOPMENT AT RISK: RETHINKING
UN-BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS (2003), available at http://wwwunrisd.org/unrisd/
website/document.nsf/0/43B9651 A57149A14C 1256E2400317557?OpenDocument.
226 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 10.
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Responsibility Report, ChevronTexaco stated that its partnership
with UNDP is for the development of a "coordinated master plan
for separate Delta projects, such as building schools, roads and
hospitals." '227 However, in response to the present author's
questions, ChevronTexaco Nigeria stated that in Nigeria, the
company's "relationship with UNDP is to help strengthen and
improve [ChevronTexaco's] record on M & E [Monitoring and
Evaluation], and adherence to [the] Sustainability Index., 228
UNDP will also provide "greater expertise in oversight functions"
as ChevronTexaco increases the number of NGOs with which the
229company is partnering.
It would appear that by engaging UNDP in the building of
schools, ChevronTexaco would be conceding that the partnership
was influenced by inadequacies in the existing arrangements for
funding community development projects. However, in response
to this author's questions, ChevronTexaco officials insisted this
was not the case.23°
While admitting that there is still room for improvement,
ChevronTexaco expresses satisfaction with its accomplishments in
community development and aims to gain recognition as the
industry leader in community engagement and development. 231
Yet, the situation of people in the oil-producing communities
remains dire, signifying that there is still more to be done. The
continuing restlessness in communities in which ChevronTexaco
operates clearly indicates that either the company is exaggerating
its achievements or that its community development efforts have
so far been ineffective against the social, economic, and
environmental problems existing in these communities. To
underscore their dissatisfaction with ChevronTexaco, local women
from the Itsekiri, Ijaw, and Ilaje ethnic groups occupied the
Escravos terminal of Chevron Nigeria Limited in the summer of
2002.232 The women wanted Chevron to provide services,
227 Id.
228 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 14.
232 See id. at 10; Nigerian Women Expand Chevron Takeover: Demands for Jobs,
Improvements, Spread to Four More Facilities of Oil Giant, EDMONTON JOURNAL, Jul.
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213facilities, and additional jobs to members of the area.
A similar controversy a few years earlier led to more serious
problems. In May 1998, Ilaje community members occupied
Chevron's Parabe oil platform protesting against the company and
asking for the provision of drinking water by the company, since
sources of water had been polluted as a consequence of the
company's oil production."' They also called for employment of
the indigenes of the area and generally, the demonstration of
greater corporate social responsibility by the company.235
Chevron's alleged response through military, naval, and mobile
police personnel resulted in the death and injury of some of the
protestors and a lawsuit in federal court in San Francisco against
Chevron.236 In April 2004, some community members shot and
killed several Nigerian sailors and two American employees of a
ChevronTexaco contractor in an area in Delta State where
ChevronTexaco was preparing to resume operations.237  These
killings were apparently an expression of opposition to the
resumption of oil operations in the area by those who had one
grievance or another with the oil industry.
B. Royal Dutch/Shell23 8
Shell began its petroleum production in Nigeria in 1937 as
Shell D'Arcy (renamed Shell-BP in 1956), a joint venture between
18, 2002, at A5; Michael Peel, Chevron Near Deal to End Women's Sit-In, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 17, 2002, at 5; Women Remain at Chevron Terminal; Nigerian Women
Storm Facility Demanding Amenities, 131 OIL DAILY, July 11, 2002, at 52; Daphne
Wysham, America's SUVs and the Women of the Niger Delta, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 11,
2002, at F1.
233 CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 205, at 10.
234 See EMEKA A. DURUIGBO, MULTINATIONAL COROPORATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY 162 (2003); Scott Pegg, The Cost of Doing Business: Transnational
Corporations and Violence in Nigeria, 30 SECURITY DIALOGUE 473, 478 (1999).
235 See Pegg, supra note 234, at 478.
236 DURUIGBO, supra note 234, at 162.
237 Sylvester Asoya, The Delta Boils Again, THE NEWS (Nig.), May 4, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News File.
238 For an extensive discussion of Shell's operations in Nigeria, see Joyce C.
Wigwe, Shell in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: A Case for Mandatory Codes of
Conduct (1997) (unpublished J.S.M. thesis, Stanford University) (on file with Stanford
University).
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Shell and Anglo-Iranian (British Petroleum from 1954) for
Nigerian operations. 39 Shell D'Arcy was granted a license to
explore oil in 1938 and this license covered the entire territory of
Nigeria.2 4' The Second World War caused the company to
withdraw in 1941, but it returned in 1946 to resume exploration
work.
241
The joint venture, which had a monopoly over the exploration
of oil in Nigeria, started its drilling activities in 1951 and
discovered the equivalent of 450 barrels of oil at Oloibiri in
1953.242 In 1956, Shell-BP made a commercial discovery of oil at
Oloibiri,243 the first time commercial quantities of oil were found
in Nigeria.244 Two years later, in 1958, a major find was made in
the Ogoni area.245 Shell has remained the leading oil producer in
Nigeria.246 This position as market leader has come with a
corresponding responsibility to assume major obligations in
relation to community development and major controversies
pertaining to its operations.
Shell's corporate philosophy toward community development
is encapsulated in its Sustainable Development Policy (SDP).247
According to a Shell Nigeria official, the policy or practice of the
company in relation to community development is driven by the
SDP and "is informed by [a] desire for project sustainability, and
participation [in] projects selections and implementation by
communit[ies].,, 248 The company says that it maintains the same
policy toward community development in every country in which
it operates "but with variations to suit needs that are specific for
countries. 2 49 An aspect of Shell's corporate philosophy toward
community development, like ChevronTexaco's, is the belief that
239 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 9 n.7.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 9.
243 Oloibiri is in present day Bayelsa State.
244 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 9.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 11.
247 See Shell's website, at http://www.shell.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
248 Shell Nigeria, Response to Questions, supra note 198.
249 Id.
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the primary responsibility for taking care of the social and
economic needs of the people rests with public officials and that
companies should not be saddled with a role that governments
should be playing.25°
Shell Nigeria's contributions to the development of
communities in which it operates take the forms of company
contributions to the NDDC, direct funding of social investment
programs, and contributions the company makes in partnership
with other donors.25' In response to the questions of whether the
company makes direct monetary grants to build infrastructure such
as roads and schools, and to whom this money is made available in
the communities, Shell responded that it makes funds directly
available to community-based organizations and Project
Management Committees established for specific project
implementation. 2
In November 2003, Shell entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with USAID to develop projects in the
Niger Delta.253 This is a $20 million Nigerian Development
Program with Shell contributing $15 million over the next five
years to the partnership and USAID contributing $5 million. 4
Sir Philip Watts, former Chairman of the Committee of
Managing Directors of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of
Companies, on the day of the announcement of the partnership
stated:
Shell already spends about $60 million annually in the Niger
Delta on its well-established social investment program. I am
proud that Shell will now be able to extend this important work
with this partnership with USAID. I am confident that that our
program together will make a significant contribution to socio-
economic development in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta in
250 Id. (stating that "[g]enerally speaking, the expectations [of community members
on the company] are enormous, a situation where the communities expect Shell to
replace [the] government and provide virtually all her social needs in the areas of
operations").
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 USAID, NIGERIA COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2009 23 (n.d.).
254 Press Release, USAID, USAID and Shell Form Partnership to Launch $20
Million Nigerian Development Program (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www
.usaid.gov/ng/pressrelease.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
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particular.255
This partnership, which is the largest USAID partnership to
date, will focus on projects in the areas of agriculture, malaria
prevention and enterprise development.256 The Cassava Enterprise
Development Project (CEDP) will receive the initial funding under
this MOU.257  Shell was to directly contribute $3 million in
addition to the USAID Nigerian Mission's investment of $1.2
million to CEDP for 2003.218 The USAID-Shell partnership is also
a supporter of the Presidential Cassava Initiative, a program that
will receive a combined contribution of $17.1 million from the
Nigerian Federal Government, state governments, and the
NDDC.259 The focus of the program is in eight states in the
Southeastern and South-southern parts of Nigeria.26°
Despite these efforts, Shell's community development record
has not been viewed favorably. Two Nigerian activists, Ike Okonta
and Oronto Douglas, documented a number of incidents in which
Shell failed to attend to the problems in many of the communities
in which it has operations, including Ogoniland (where it has not
been allowed to resume operations), Nembe, Okoroba, Iko,
Bonny, Forcados, and Ughelli.261 Shell indicates that there are
areas in its current approach to community development that
would benefit from improvement.262 Aspects the company has
identified include "external stakeholder engagement, NGOs or
partnerships for joint funding of programmes... and [p]roject
execution supervision.., possibly done by external bodies [and]
255 Id.
256 USAID, supra note 253, at 23.
257 Id. CEDP is an initiative whose goal is to provide income for cassava farmers in
eleven Nigerian states by increasing production, expanding post-harvest, value added
processing, and identifying commercial markets for cassava. Press Release, USAID,
USAID and Shell Form Partnership to Launch $20 Million Nigerian Development
Program (Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ng/pressrelease.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2004). "Cassava is one of the most widely-cultivated crops in Nigeria
and provides food and income to over thirty million farmers and large numbers of
processors and traders." Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 See OKONTA & DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 74-95.
262 Shell Nigeria, Response to Questions, supra note 198.
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NGOs. 2
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C. Other Corporate Arrangements
In November of 1998, an MOU was signed between three
companies - Shell, Mobil and Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas
Limited (NLNG) - and representatives of the Bonny Kingdom.264
Under the MOU, described as "the first agreement of that nature
signed between oil companies and a community, 265 the companies
agreed on the construction of a 2.7 kilometer road on Bonny Island
and the provision of pipe-borne water and electricity within two
years.266 One advantage of this arrangement is that the companies
entered an area to operate with the express consent of the
community, not simply the consent of the state governor as
previously has been the case.267 Such an arrangement could help
reduce conflicts, especially if all the parties live up to their
bargains.268
The initial stage of implementation of this arrangement,
however, encountered major problems. Protests erupted in Bonny
when the youth from that town complained that the management
of the NLNG consortium was not implementing the terms of the
MOU. 269 The protests led to stoppage of NLNG operations for
nearly three days.270 Military intervention led to the death of one
protestor and injuries to many others.2 7 ' The protests raised the ire
of Nigeria's President who visited Bonny and made it clear that
the government would not hesitate to deal ruthlessly with such
activities that could hamper economic growth and send the wrong
263 Id.
264 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 52. Bonny is the city in Rivers State that hosts Shell's
export terminal. Opuenebo Binya Owei, A Partnership Framework for Managing an
Emerging Urban Region: The Bonny Experiment in Rivers State, Nigeria, 40TH
ISOCARP CONGRESS (2004), available at http://www.isocarp.org/Data/casestudies
/451 .pdf.
265 Owei, supra note 264.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Worika, supra note 122.
270 Id.
271 Id.
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signals to foreign investors.2" The youth claimed that they were
not afforded an opportunity to state their case.273
Another interesting arrangement was recently entered into
between BP and the Norwegian state oil company, Statoil, on the
one hand, and several NGOs on the other. This Akassa Project is
a self-help project to promote sustainable development. 74 BP-
Statoil has engaged the services of two respected NGOs, Pro-
Natura International and the Niger Delta Wetlands Centre, to
execute the projects on its behalf.275  A strength of this
arrangement is that it has the potential to "satisfy the demands of
communities better than previous development projects because
the local people would have a much greater say in the execution of
the project." '276
V. Two Problems Thwarting Public and Private Initiatives:
Corruption and Public Participation
Two major problems that have hampered the success of the
public and private initiatives evaluated above are corruption and
the lack of public participation in the formulation and
implementation of decisions that affect community members.
This Part of the article discusses these problems.
A. Corruption
Corruption has been defined as the co-optation or use of public
resources for private gain or personal benefit.277 Corruption
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 52.
275 Id. The Pro-Natura partnership with business in Nigeria also includes Shell and
TotalFinaElf. See PRO-NATURA, PRO-NATURA AND INDUSTRY, available at
http://biodiversityeconomics.org/pdf/020831-27.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
276 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 52-53.
277 THE WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK 8 (1997); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME TRANSPARENCY, No
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE USE OF OIL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 39 (2004), available at http//www.hrw.org/reports/2004/angolaOl04/
angola04.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2004); Press Release, Transparency International,
Frequently Asked Questions About the Corruption Perceptions Index: 2002 (Aug. 28,
2002), available at http//www.transparency.org/cpi/2002cpi2OO2-fag.enhtml (last visited
Sept. 8, 2004). Larry Diamond remarks that the past few years have witnessed an
increased rejection of the idea favored in some (including respected) quarters not too
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manifests itself in various facets of Nigerian life.278 Because of its
size and significance in Nigerian life, the oil and gas industry
affords numerous opportunities for corruption at various levels.
1. Corruption in Public Initiatives
Perhaps the public initiatives are the best illustration of the
effects of corruption. Corruption has been identified as a major
factor for the ineffectiveness of community development and
poverty alleviation efforts in the oil-producing communities.279
"[O]ne of the most likely explanations [for the failures of
government and corporate development efforts] is the influence of
the prevalent corruption and inefficiency in Nigeria on the conduct
of government officials, oil company staff and local
contractors., 280  OMPADEC essentially failed because of
long ago that corruption could have some beneficial effects in countries where it was
prevalent. Professor Diamond calls this, rightly in my view, a revolution:
Over the past decade, a revolution has been gathering force in politics,
development, and international affairs. At every level of public life, people and
organizations dedicated to the advancement of democracy, social justice,
poverty alleviation, conflict prevention, and international cooperation for these
ends are rebelling against political and bureaucratic corruption. A few decades
ago, a great many scholars, aid officials, and international investors viewed
corruption as a transitory and inevitable concomitant of the processes of
economic and political development, or "nation building." Some argued that
corruption actually had positive effects, in lubricating the wheels of a turgid
bureaucracy and in binding diverse individuals and groups to the nation's
government and politics through the distribution of "patronage." Others
recognized the net costs and inefficiencies of corruption, but wrote them off as
the "cost of doing business" or rationalized them as a price of transition to a
modem, better-educated society that would no longer tolerate them. The era of
excusing, rationalizing, and looking the other way is, fortunately, over.
Larry Diamond, Building a System of Comprehensive Accountability to Control
Corruption, Paper Presented to the Seminar on Democratic Consolidation: The
International Context and the Mexican Experience, Sponsored by the Federal Electoral
Institute of Mexico, Mexico City (Feb. 18-20, 2003) (on file with the author).
278 USAID, supra note 253, at 22 (stating "[c]orruption is deeply entrenched at all
levels of Nigerian life"); Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in
Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (2002); Ebere
Onwudiwe, Nigeria, in FREEDOM HOUSE: COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2004: A
SURVEY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, available at http://www.freedomhouse.
org/research/crossroads/cac.htm (last visited May 26, 2004).
279 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 53.
280 Id.
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mismanagement of resources and massive corruption.281 It is
disturbing that even at this early stage in the NDDC's operations,
the commission is already associated with controversy regarding
its enormous expenditures on presidential politics, an issue that
has nothing to do with improving the conditions of the people in
the oil-producing areas."'
2. Corruption in Private Initiatives
Equally disturbing are allegations that corporate officials seek
to profit personally from their companies' community
development funds.283 This allegedly takes place through the
inflation of project costs, the award of contracts to cronies and
corrupt contractors, and the outright pocketing of funds allocated
for contracts. 84
For example, Shell has been accused of corruption among its
staff.285 One instance concerned the completion of an elementary
school in Ogoniland at an estimated cost of $5 million when
projections indicated that it could have been constructed at a
fraction of that sum. 286 Shell responded to the allegations in the
following manner:
There are policies and procedures for placing contracts that are
awarded to third party contractors. Contracts are generally
placed through open tendering and awards based on benchmark
costs. Project costs are controlled by many factors including
location, size, quality, duration, cost of labour, etc. Variations in
costs are normally within allowable tolerances. The group
business principle guides the conduct of staff on ethics, and staff
who are found to have compromised are released if
investigations prove complicity.
287
281 Id.
282 Eluemunor, supra note 193.
283 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 53.
284 Id.
285 Interview with Michael Fleshman, formerly Human Rights Coordinator for the
Africa Fund, in New York (Jan. 30, 2004). See Michael Fleshman, Report on the Crisis
in the Niger Delta, Nigeria Transition Watch Number 10, Report from Nigeria 2, THE
AFRICA FuND, June 17, 1999.
286 Michael Fleshman, Report on the Crisis in the Niger Delta, Nigeria Transition
Watch Number 10, Report from Nigeria 2, THE AFRICA FuND, June 17, 1999.
287 Shell Nigeria, Response to Questions, supra note 198.
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ChevronTexaco also concedes that corruption is a recurring
issue at the community leadership level, making it, inter alia, a
hindrance to channeling community development money through
community leadership.288 It refutes the allegation, however, that
the company's community relations staff are also engaged in
corrupt practices that work against the efficacy of community
development initiatives.289  ChevronTexaco asserts that it
maintains a zero tolerance policy toward internal corruption.
According to the company:
Zero tolerance is our policy. It is the key to ensuring that
corruption never rears its ugly head, and stamping it out if it
does. Any employee caught is promptly dismissed. Cash for
development is not handled by community relations staff but
paid directly to NGOs accounts or, in the case of infrastructure
construction, through a building contractor's accounts. These are
easily verifiable and can be audited by third parties.
290
3. Corruption at the Community Level
At the community level, corruption has been checked to an
extent through a de-emphasis on community grants and a greater
focus on direct execution of contracts by the oil companies and the
contractors they select in conjunction with community leaders.29'
Yet, avenues for corruption persist. Companies have control over
the award of security contracts, which usually go to community
members. 292 These security contracts have been associated with
corruption and conflicts.293  Compensation paid for land or
property acquisition or environmental damage has also been prone
to corruption.294 More importantly, even in cases of direct
funding, there have been allegations of community leaders trying
288 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Dimieari Von Kemedi, Community Conflicts in the Niger Delta: Petro- Weapon
or Policy Failure? WP 03-12, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, 2003, available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/EnvirPol/
WP/12-VonKemedi.pdf (last visited May 26, 2004).
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
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to cut deals with contractors to abandon their projects before
completion.2 95  In these cases, the community leader would
endorse that the project has been completed if the contractor gives
a substantial portion of the contract fee to the community leader.2 96
4. Why Corruption is Prevalent
Although this scenario could benefit the contractors, the
community leaders, and to an extent the oil companies, since the
community leaders would not trouble them for a while, it inflicts
tremendous harm to the communities in general. They do not get
the benefit of community development projects, and this could
lead to renewed agitation from members of the community,
resulting in more problems for the companies and government.
Even the community leaders may profit from this renewed round
of restlessness, as the companies may be compelled to provide
additional funds for community development, channeling them
through these same corrupt leaders.2 97
The oil companies officially frown at corruption at the
community leadership level,298 but this corrosive problem persists.
Shell states that it "is guided by social structures in place and will
work with leaders recognized by the communities. Our business
principles guide relationships and the conduct of business with
community leaders and do not support corruption in any form." '299
With the minimal level of transparency that exists at the
governmental, corporate, and community levels, it is hardly
surprising that oil-producing communities remain mired in poverty
and squalor. The importance of devising revenue management
institutions that would emphasize transparency and accountability
cannot be overemphasized. If transactions are open to the public
and monitoring is provided by credible, independent groups, there
is the possibility that the fortunes of people in oil-producing
communities will improve. It is a great idea to increase allocation
of revenues from companies and government for community
295 Id.
296 Information gathered by the author from discussions with Nigerians involved in
the oil industry.
297 Kemedi, supra note 291.
298 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
299 Shell Nigeria, Response to Questions, supra note 198.
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development, but if these monies continue to be siphoned to
private bank accounts there is little hope of improving the plight of
the people and environment in the oil-producing areas of Nigeria.
B. Public Participation in Decision-Making
Another major element contributing to the failure of public and
private initiatives is the absence of meaningful participation by
community members in the creation and execution of policies and
projects directly impacting them. There is no precise definition of
public participation in decision-making.3"' The growing
importance of this concept at the domestic and international levels
cannot be ignored. This is particularly true in the natural resources
arena." 1 Public participation is of significance in three broad
areas: (1) issues relating to the environment; (2) issues regarding
the development of resources (such as oil, gas and mining
projects); and, (3) issues regarding the socio-economic
development of communities.
The Rio Declaration of 1992 endorses public participation,
saying in Principle 10 that "[e]nvironmental issues are best
handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level," adding that "[a]t the national level, each individual
shall have.., the opportunity to participate in decision-making
processes.302 The 1998 Aarhus Convention, which took effect in
300 George (Rock) Pring & Susan Y. Noe, The Emerging International Law of
Public Participation Affecting Global Mining, Energy, and Resources Development, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 11, 15 (Zillman et al. eds.,
2002); Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making at
the New Millenium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 263, 266 (1999); Norman Wengert, Citizen Participation: Practice in Search of
a Theory, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 23 (1976).
301 See Barry Barton, Public Participation in Resources Development, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, 77, 77 (Zillman et al., eds., 2002)
(stating that "[i]n the last twenty-five years, public participation has become more
significant in energy and natural resources development, and in environmental
management generally"); Donald N. Zillman, Introduction to Public Participation in the
Twenty-first Century, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, 1, 1
(Zillman et al., eds., 2002) (stating that the "growth of public participation in major
natural resource decisions is one of the signal developments of the last years of the
Twentieth Century").
302 Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, adopted
by the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), princ. 10, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. 1) (1992); 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
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2001, is perhaps the most far-reaching and influential treaty on
this subject and has detailed provisions on access to information,
public participation in decision-making and access to justice.3"3
With regard to public participation in decision-making, the
Convention provides for public involvement in decisions relating
to mining projects, energy sector facilities (such as refineries,
large power plants, and nuclear plants), metals production and
processing facilities and other development activities. 304 There are
also provisions for participation in environmental decision-making
processes.3 5 International financial institutions such as the World
Bank have embraced the aspects of public participation as well by
implementing policies providing for them.30 6
Not everyone is enamored with public participation, and the
concept certainly has some drawbacks. Critics contend that it is
expensive and time consuming and that community members, who
often allow their emotional attachments to guide them, are not in
the best position to make some of these important and technical
decisions. 37 Besides, some of what is called public participation
is actually participation by members from the upper stratum of the
socio-economic scale, and the participation and the views of the
elite should not be taken as those of the majority of the
population.3 8 One scholar captures the prevailing cynicism about
public participation in the following words: "[a] composite list of
what is expected of citizen participation is staggering, for
participation appears to be akin to the snake oil of ancient vendors.
It is supposed to cure whatever is ailing the body politic at the
moment. ,
3 0 9
303 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making,
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, entered into by the U.N.
Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/43 (1998), available
at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
304 Id. Annex I.
305 Id. art. 6(2).
306 See Pring & Noe, supra note 300, at 52-55.
307 Id. at 25.
308 Id.
309 MARY GRiSEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 36 (1981). See also Pring & Noe, supra
note 300, at 23 (noting that extolling the virtues of participation drives some
communities to cynicism).
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Nevertheless, there are a number of advantages that can be
derived from public participation. A decision that is made with
adequate consideration of the perspectives of those who will live
with the consequences thereof will ultimately be a better one.31°
Public participation also engenders a sense of empowerment in
those who participate, strengthens local communities and other
groups, promotes conflict reduction among competing interests,
facilitates the accountability of public officials, and imbues the
decisions reached with greater legitimacy. 1  The decisions
reached are more likely to reflect the needs and the public values
of the local communities as well.31 2 In addition, the decisions have
chances of better substantive quality,313 although this too is
debatable."'
Public participation would be particularly useful in the context
of socio-economic development of Nigerian oil-producing
communities where feelings of alienation pervade the atmosphere,
resulting in frosty relations between the community members on
one hand and community leadership, oil corporations, and
government on the other.3"5  Involving local communities,
including both the leadership and the ordinary citizens, in
development activities will comport with the right to development.
This right is believed to incorporate recognition that "peoples have
the right to determine their model of development."'3 16 The Human
Rights Council of Australia, while contending that participation is
a component of the right to development, noted that "people
310 See Michael R. Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental
Protection: An Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 1,
9 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996) (stating that "[i]f the people who
make the decisions are the same as those who pay for and live by the consequences of
the decisions, then we go a long way toward protecting the environment").
311 Pring & Noe, supra note 300, at 22.
312 Id.
313 Id. For an additional discussion on the rationale and criticisms of public
participation, see Barton, supra note 301, at 99-109.
314 A study conducted in the United States did not confirm that environmental
public participation actually resulted in better decisions. See J. Clarence Davies,
Environmental ADR and Public Participation, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 389, 393 (2000).
315 See Winter, supra note 157.
316 Anne Orford, Globalisation and the Right to Development, in PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
139 (P. Alston ed., 2001).
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should have control over the direction of the development process,
rather than simply being consulted about projects and policies that
have already been decided upon." '317
The case for allowing people in oil-producing communities to
be masters of their own fate when it comes to the utilization of oil
revenues cannot be overemphasized. It is imperative to cultivate a
sense of ownership in the people, so they at least have a stake in
these resources rather than simply having handouts thrown at
them. Most importantly, a sense of ownership may pave the way
to real development in these communities. One arrangement that
incorporates both corruption control and public participation is
that of the community-based trust fund, discussed below.
VI. A Proposed Alternative: Community-Based Trust Funds
Based on foregoing evaluation of the status quo, this work
proposes a fundamental change in the way community
development activities are handled in the oil-producing
communities. A veritable vehicle for introducing and
implementing this change is the concept of trust funds. Part V
includes a discussion of trusts generally, an analysis of trusts in the
context of Nigerian customary law, a comparative study of trusts
and trust-like instruments as used in Chad, Canada, and Alaska,
and the author's proposed model for community-based trusts in
Nigeria.
A. The Concept of Trust Funds
A trust is an arrangement in law in which legal ownership of
an asset, the res, is transferred to a trustee who becomes
responsible for managing the res for the benefit of another person
or persons, the beneficiaries.3"8 Keeton defines a trust in the
following words:
[A trust] is the relationship which arises wherever a person
(called the trustee) is compelled in equity to hold property,
whether real or personal, and whether by legal or equitable title,
for the benefit of some persons (of whom he may be one and
30 Ebeku, supra note 105, at 204 (quoting a publication of the Human Rights
Council of Australia, Inc.).
318 See Marianne Guerin-McManus, Conservation Trust Funds, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2001).
[Vol. 30
MANAGING OIL REVENUES
who are termed beneficiaries) or for some object permitted by
law, in such a way that the real benefit of the property accrues,
not to the trustees, but to the beneficiaries or other objects of the
trust.3 19
In the case of oil trust funds, the revenue, or a part thereof,
derived from oil exploration and production constitutes the trust
assets which a board of trustees is empowered to manage for the
benefit of the general population.
There are disparate and disputed accounts about the origins of
the trust as an institution in Anglo-American law.32 ° Some writers
trace the origin of trusts to the English Use Laws or Middle
Eastern/Islamic Law's waqf, while others trace it to Roman
fideicommissum.321 Additionally, the Germanic theory on the
origin of the trust asserts that it originated from the Salic
salmannus.322 Regardless of where one settles on this long-
standing debate,323 it remains clear that trusts have generally
emerged as a result of deficiencies in the legal mechanisms
instituted for the management of property.324  Thus, the
inadequacies attendant to oil revenue management in Nigeria
make this a particularly attractive concept.
Frederic Maitland made an apt observation many decades ago
that "[o]f all the exploits of equity, the largest and the most
important is the invention and development of the trust."325
Lately, trust funds have been attracting attention in academic and
319 L.A. SHERIDAN & GEORGE W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 5 (Professional
Books Ltd. eds., 11th ed. 1983); DAVID J. HAYTON, UNDERHILL & HAYTON LAW
RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 3 (Butterworth ed., 1 5 th ed. 1995). For an extensive
discussion of trust law and practice internationally and in a number of domestic
jurisdictions, including Canada, Japan, United States and Europe, see MODERN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW (David Hayton ed., 1999).
320 See Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 3-5.
321 See Avisheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the Modern English Trust
Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1996).
322 See Monica M. Gaudiosi, Comment, The Influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on
the Development of the Trust in England, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1242-43 (1988).
323 This debate has spanned at least a century. See, e.g., Frederic Maitland, The
Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127 (1894); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science
and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443 (1899).
324 See Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 5.
325 W.C. Ekow Daniels, Some Principles of the Law of Trusts in West Africa, 6 J.
AFR. L. 164, 164 (1962).
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
policy circles as pragmatic tools for addressing the unfortunate
predicament generally manifesting in entities blessed with natural
resources, especially oil.326 According to Stephen Krasner:
Oil has been a curse for the developing countries in which it has
been located leading to less democracy and lower rates of
growth. Oil concentrates resources in the hands of the state.
The road to wealth and power for any ambitious individual leads
through the offices of the central government, not through
individual enterprise or productive economic activity. Oil
wealth makes it possible for the state to buy off dissenters, and
to build military machines that can be used to repress those who
cannot be bought off. Only a few political entities, such as
Alaska and Norway, have been able to use oil wealth wisely.
Domestic governance in oil rich developing countries could be
enhanced by creating oil trusts. The board of directors of such
trusts would be composed of national and non-national actors.
For instance, national directors could be appointed by the
country's parliament or head of state and non-national figures by
the World Bank. All oil revenues would be paid into an escrow
account in a foreign bank. All transfers from the account would
have to be approved by the board of directors of the trust. There
might be commitment to using these revenues for specific
activities such as health care and education. The trust would
monitor the use of the funds after they had been transferred to
327the national government.
Utilizing trust funds to manage public properties, including
natural resources, is not an entirely new phenomenon, nor is the
creation of a trust wholly dependent on the mismanagement of
resources. 328 A trust fund can be used to accomplish a variety of
326 See Stephen Krasner, Troubled Societies, Outlaw States, and Gradations of
Sovereignty 41 (July 20, 2002), available at www.sas.upenn.edu/brownecip/200304
%20Papers/Krasner%20paper.pdf (unpublished manuscript, on file with Stanford
University).
327 Id. The proposal described by Krasner bears significant resemblance to the oil
management and monitoring arrangement under the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project.
See generally SAVE THE CHILDREN, LIFTING THE RESOURCE CURSE: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRY, CHILDREN AND GOVERNANCE 11 (2003) (describing the Chad Oil Pipeline
Project's revenue management arrangement as an oil trust fund). The Chad arrangement
is discussed in Subpart C, infra.
328 See, e.g., Tito et al. v. Waddel et al. (No. 2) [1977] 3 All ER 129 (a dispute over
whether the Crown was the trustee of the funds collected from phosphate sale royalties
for the inhabitants of an island colony in the Western Pacific); Sir Joseph Gold, Trust
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objectives including conservation of natural resources,329
protection of the environment,33  and development of
communities.33'
B. Trusts in Nigerian Customary Law
It is important to emphasize that the trust institution is not the
exclusive preserve of Western and Islamic legal systems.332 In
centuries past, African societies have been able to devise trust-like
institutions to address particular needs, such as the management of
family or communal property.33 3 In Amodu Tjani v. Secretary of
Southern Nigeria,334 Viscount Haldane stated:
The notion of individual ownership is quite foreign to native
ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village or the family,
never to the individual. All the members of the community,
village, or family have an equal right to the land, but in every
case the Chief or Headman of the community or village, or head
of the family, has charge of the land, and in loose mode of
speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to some extent in
the position of a trustee and as such holds the land for the use of
the community or family.335
In Ozomah v. Ozomah,336 the court held that the head of the
family, who took over the management of a brother's property at
his death, was trustee of the property where the deceased kinsman
Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the International Monetary Fund to a
Code of Principles, 72 AM. J. INT'L. L. 856, 856 (1978).
329 Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 8.
330 Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial Mechanisms
for Sustainable Growth, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 167-
70 (W. Lang ed., 1995).
331 See Kyle W. Danish, International Environmental Law and The "Bottom-Up"
Approach: A Review of The Desertification Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD.
133, 169 n.162 (1995).
332 See Daniels, supra note 325, at 164 (discussing the existence of trusts or trust-
like institutions in Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone); J.O. FABUNMI, EQUITY AND
TRUSTS IN NIGERIA 144 (1986).
333 T.O. ELIAS, NIGERIAN LAND LAW 78 (4th ed. 1971).
334 2 A.C. 399 (1921).
335 Id. at 404. Similar statements have been made regarding the same issue in other
West African countries. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 325, at 168.
336 M.N.L.R. 88 (1965/66) (mentioned in J.D. BAKIBINGA, LAW OF TRUSTS IN
NIGERIA 5 (1989)).
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died without a son who was sui juris.337  The trustee is therefore
accountable to the cestui que trust until the beneficiary-son comes
of (legal) age and demands return of the property. 338
Graham-Paul J., in Balogun v. Balogun,339 provided further
justification for the trustee analogy in relation to the position of
the head of the family on the premise that:
[The family head] is in charge and control of the family
property; he collects the revenue of the family property; he has
to make certain disbursements out of the family revenue for
family purposes, upkeep of the family property, funeral,
marriage and baptism ceremonial expenses of the members of
the family often involving the entertainment of strangers,
litigations on behalf of the family, maintenance of indigent
members of the family, education of children.
340
It should be noted that while under Anglo-American law legal
ownership of the property resides in the trustee, under Nigerian
customary law, the person in the position of trustee is not the
owner; the property belongs to the family or community as a
whole.341 Nevertheless, the trustee's duty of management of
337 Id.
338 Id.; see also ADIGUN, CASES & TEXTS ON EQUITY, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES 277 (1987) (discussing how some African societies have placed the head of
the family in a position similar to a trustee so as to manage property for the benefit of
other family members).
339 2. W.A.C.A. 290 (1935).
340 Id. at 299. See also BAKIBINGA, supra note 336, at 2-6 (analyzing relevant
Nigerian judicial opinions that discuss the position and functions of traditional heads,
their relationship to those of the trustee in the English sense, and limitations of the
analogy).
341 See S.N. CHNWUBA OBI, MODERN FAMILY LAW IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA 56-57
(Sweet & Maxwell eds., 1966); A. A. UTUAMA, NIGERIAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 7
(1989). Utuama states:
Although the headman of the community in the exercise of his powers, is
sometimes described as a trustee... he is not, strictly speaking, a trustee in the
English sense. Unlike the trustee in the conventional sense, the title to the
communal land is not vested in him. The title remains vested in the community
as a corporate entity. The institution of communal land lacks, therefore, the
division into legal and equitable ownership that is the fundamental principle of
trust property. In strict legal terms, the application of [the] trusteeship analogy
to the head of the community is inaccurate. In spite of this misnomer, our
courts continued in the past to describe the chief or the headman of the
community as trustee, particularly wherever his duty to account was called into
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common property for the general benefit is analogous to that of the
Anglo-America trust. More importantly, it makes the Nigerian
customary version well-suited to the arrangement proposed here,
considering the essence of the proposed trust funds is the proper
management of communal assets by those holding a fiduciary
position.
41
C. Comparative Evaluation of Trusts in Various Settings
This subpart evaluates three trust funds or trust-like
arrangements introduced in some oil-producing countries to ensure
the proper management of oil revenues. The revenue management
plan established for the people of Chad under the Chad-Cameroon
pipeline project provides an example of a national funding
mechanism.3 43  The Alaska Permanent Fund is a state-level
institution.3' The Nunavut Trust, while applicable to the Territory
of Nunavut (akin to a province or state), nevertheless is illustrative
of a community-based arrangement by reason of its application to
a relatively small number of people.345
1. Chad
The Revenue Management Plan (RMP) established under the
Chad-Cameroon pipeline project contains specifications for the
allocation and distribution of revenues that would accrue from oil
development in Chad.346 During the first ten years of production,
question and his liability was determined.
Id. (citations omitted).
342 M.G. YAKUBU, LAND LAW IN NIGERIA 61 (1985) (noting that while the trustee in
Nigerian customary law is not a trustee in the strict sense of English law, the trustee still
owes duties of a fiduciary nature to the members of the community, including the duty to
account and the duty of loyalty, which constrains him in a way that avoids conflicts of
interest). For further discussion of trusts from the English and Nigerian contexts, see
GILBERT KODILINYE, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY IN NIGERIA (Sweet & Maxwell ed.,
1975).
343 See infra Subpart VI.C. 1.
344 See infra Subpart VI.C.2.
345 See infra Subpart VI.C.3.
346 The World Bank and IFC Chad-Cameroon: Petroleum Development and
Pipeline Project, Project Appraisal Document, Apr. 13, 2000, Annex II [hereinafter
Revenue Management Plan], available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSIBank Servlet?pcont=-details&eid=000094946_00102111244720 (last visited Oct.
14, 2004).
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income taxes will represent 16% of total revenues to Chad while
the remaining revenues are expected from royalties and
dividends.347 The government has a relatively wide discretion on
how to spend the revenues from income taxes, subject to the
limitation that they be used for general development purposes.
348
The government's liberty is more circumscribed in reference to
royalties and dividends; the RMP provides for a Special Revenue
Account for the deposit of royalties and dividends.349
The RMP also specifies a distribution formula. Ten percent of
the money will be kept in deposit at international financial
institutions as a fund for future generations (the "Future
Generations Fund).35 ° Eighty-five percent of the remaining 90%
percent will be deposited in local commercial banks and dedicated
to the financing of programs in five critical sectors, namely:
education, health and social services, rural development,
infrastructure, and environment and water resources.35" ' The
remaining 5% is devoted to the government budget and the
development of the oil-producing Doba region.352
Several layers of oversight and control are provided for under
the RMP.35 3 The World Bank and the government of Chad are
responsible for approving an annual budget, while a nine-member
oversight committee is empowered to review it.354  Of the
committee's nine members, seven represent the government while
two members, an NGO and a trade union, are drawn from civil
society.3 55 The committee will publish an annual review of those
operations that is subject to external audit.356
347 See id. at 100. See also Benjamin C. Esty & Carrie Ferman, The Chad-
Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (A), Harvard Business School
9-202-010 (Rev: Jan. 16, 2003), at 8 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard
Business School).
348 Esty & Ferman, supra note 347, at 8.
349 Revenue Management Plan, supra note 346, at 96.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.; Esty & Ferman, supra note 347, at 8.
353 Esty & Ferman, supra note 347, at 8.
354 Revenue Management Plan, supra note 346, at 97.
355 Id.
356 Id.
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The World Bank also has far-reaching powers and leverage in
relation to the monitoring of the full program and review of all
expenditures. The RMP is further strengthened by the World
Bank's insistence that its implementation is a contractual
obligation under the loans that the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development and European Investment Bank
were proposing.357 The World Bank also tied the government's
performance under the RMP to any future lending by the Bank.358
There is also an International Advisory Group instituted by the
World Bank. The Group is comprised of eminent persons and is
slated to function for ten years.359 An additional level of oversight
for the entire project is provided by the World Bank Inspection
Panel.36
In December 1998, the government of Chad passed a law
incorporating the major components of the RMP, including
procedures for audit and provisions relating to the establishment of
an oversight committee, the Oil Revenues Control and Monitoring
Board (Revenue Management College).36' Under the Oil Revenue
Management Law, 10% of royalty and dividend revenues are
allocated to the future generations fund, while local banks would
hold the balance of royalty and dividend revenues in special
accounts. 362  The law allocates 80% of these funds to the five
357 Id. at 98.
358 Id.
359 WORLD BANK, THE CHAD-CAMEROON DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE PROJECT,
DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE - INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY GROUP ON THE CHAD
CAMEROON OIL PIPELINE PROJECTS, available at http://www.gic-
iag.org/doc/iag-toren.pdf (last visited June 2, 2004). The work and reports of the group
are available at its website, http://www.gic-iag.org/ (last visited June 2, 2004).
360 Genoveva Hernandez Uriz, The Application of the World Bank Standards to the
Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility? 28 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 77, 120 (2002).
361 Oil Revenue Management Law, No. 001/PR/99 (1998), translated in Revenue
Management Plan, supra note 346, at Annex 11, Part B. For a critical evaluation of the
Revenue Management Plan and Oil Revenue Management Law, see Ian Gary & Terry
Lynn Karl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor (June 17, 2003) (report
released by Catholic Relief Services), available at http://www.catholicrelief.org
/africanoil.cfm, and Luc Lampriere et al., Managing Oil Revenues in Chad: Legal
Deficiencies and Institutional Weaknesses (Oct. 13, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Harvard Law School Human Rights Clinical Program).
362 Oil Revenue Management Law, No. 001/PR/99 (1998), at art. 3, translated in
Revenue Management Plan, supra note 346, at Annex 11, Part B.
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priority sectors enumerated above in accordance with
Parliamentary approved budgets363 and allocates 5% of royalties to
the oil-producing region.364 During the first five years of oil
production, 15% of royalties and dividends are to be allocated to
financing government expenditures.365
It is still too early to accurately draw conclusions about the
success of this revenue management arrangement.366 Chad only
commenced oil sales in October of 2003.367 In November of 2003,
$6.5 million received from the first sale of crude oil was deposited
into the account and in December of that same year, the
government approved its first budget including oil revenue, and
submitted it to the Revenue Management College.368 Still, the
Chad-Cameroon revenue management arrangement can be viewed
as a useful model that could be replicated in other countries.369
2. Alaska
The Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) has been described as a
363 Id. art. 8(a).
364 Id. art. 8(c).
365 Id. art. 8(b).
366 See Korinna Horta and Delphine Djiraibe, Africa's Dangerous Treasure, WASH.
POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at A29 (stating that initial indicators from Chad provide cause for
pause).
367 Emily Wax, Oil Wealth Trickles Into Chad, but Little Trickles Down Five
Months After Opening of Pipeline to Cameroon, Locals Await Benefits and Crime Rate
Rises, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at A16. See also Oil Pipeline Opens for Business, 17
AFRICA RECOVERY 24 (United Nations Department of Public Information, Oct. 2003)
(discussing how the Chad government agreed to a stringent set of controls on the
handling and disbursements of the oil revenues in order to secure World Bank support
for the project).
368 Wax, supra note 367.
369 The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: A New Model for Natural Resource
Development, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on
International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 10-14 (Apr. 18,
2002); Gary & Karl, supra note 361, at 60 - 73. Some commentators are a bit more
skeptical, however, viewing the project as not properly structured to withstand the
political games that might be played by the government of Chad when it believes that it
would be too late for the World Bank and oil corporations to withdraw. See, e.g., James
C. Owens, Note, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa: The International
Community's Options, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1046-48 (2003) (calling instead for the
creation of an international supervisory body that would be responsible for controlling
and allocating the revenues accruing to developing states from international projects).
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"bold and innovative approach to managing natural resource
wealth."37 Through a constitutional amendment approved by the
people of Alaska in 1976, the APF was created.371 By virtue of the
amendment to the Alaskan Constitution, 25% of mineral revenues
paid to the State of Alaska is deposited into a fund to be invested
and managed for the benefit of present and future generations of
Alaskans.372 The mineral revenues encompass all mineral lease
rentals, royalties, proceeds from royalty sale, federal mineral
revenue sharing payments and bonuses.3 73 Three years subsequent
to the creation of the APF, the Alaskan legislature increased the
applicable percentage of mineral revenues to be deposited into the
fund from the 25% guaranteed by the Constitution to 50% for
certain types of oil and gas receipts.3
74
The underlying objectives behind the creation of the fund were
to set aside oil revenues for the benefit of Alaskans and to forestall
any effort by the politicians to spend the accruing petroleum
revenues in an inappropriate manner.3 75 Indeed, the "creation of
th[e] fund was a reaction to the state's initial management of its oil
windfall when over $900 million, which had been paid to the state
for the original drilling leases, was squandered by the state
government.,
376
The APF is managed by the Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation (APFC), a body created in 1980.177 Like any other
trust fund manager, the APFC aims to ensure that at all times, the
safety of the principal is maintained and total returns are
370 SVETLANA TSALIK, CASPIAN OIL WINDFALLS: WHO WILL BENEFIT? 24 (Robert
Ebel ed., 2003).
371 ALASKA CONST. art. IX, §15.
372 ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FUND AND OF
ALASKA, at http://www.apfc.org/publications/pfhistory.cfm?s=5 (last visited Sept. 10,
2004).
373 Laurence S. Smith, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Federal Taxation ofAlaska
Permanent Fund Dividend Payments, 11 ALASKA L. REv. 97, 99 (1994).
374 S. Michael Gray, Can State Regulation of Renewable Electricity Achieve
Discriminatory Effects on Interstate Trade Without Triggering the Dormant Commerce
Clause?, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 783, 791 (2003); Smith, supra note 373, at 99.
375 See Merrill F. Hoopengardner, Note, Nontraditional Venture Capital: An
Economic Development Strategy for Alaska, 20 ALASKA L. REv. 357, 358 (2003).
376 Id. at 358, n.5.
377 ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 372.
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maximized.378 The Alaskan Constitution also provides investment
guidance that reflects the Harvard College379  standard on
speculation. To date, the APF has managed over $25 billion.38°
With the growth of the APF, Alaskans demanded a return of some
of the wealth to the citizens in the form of tax repeal and cash
distributions.38" ' The legislature responded to the citizens' demand
by enacting legislation that mandated the distribution of a portion
of the fund's earnings to the residents of the state through dividend
payments.382 Remarking on the option of dividend payments, one
economist observed that "[t]he idea is, people will care more about
how the fund is managed if they know that money is part
theirs. 383 In addition, "the dividend program was chosen on the
belief that Alaska's citizens, as owners of the state's natural
resource wealth, are entitled to benefit directly from this
wealth. ,384
Oversight of the APF is provided through a system of checks
and balances. The APFC makes independent investment decisions
but is not excused from accountability to the government and
people of Alaska.385  The APFC receives guidance through an
independent board of trustees whose membership includes four
members of the public appointed by the governor, the
Commissioner of Revenue, and another member of the
378 See David Germain, Alaska's Battling Philip Morris, But Making Millions on its
Stock, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, MD), Feb. 24, 1997, at 24.
379 Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). Justice Putnam of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated the standard as follows:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself
faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men of
prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to
be invested.
Id. at 461.
380 ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 372.
381 Smith, supra note 373, at 99.
382 Id.
383 Vicki Quade, $1,000-per-Alaskan Plan to Share Oil Wealth, 68 A.B.A.J. 797,
797 (1982) (quoting James Rhode, an economist in Anchorage, Alaska.
384 TSALIK, supra note 370, at 22.
385 Id.
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administration.386 The legislative branch exercises control and
provides oversight through final approval of investments and the
work of the Legislative Budget and Audit Committee.387 The
public also plays a role in the oversight because removal of board
members is effective only when accompanied by a statement
disclosed to the public containing the reasons for removal.388 The
combination of these layers of oversight provides some
explanation for why the APF has endured over the years.38 9
A salient feature of the APF is an emphasis on transparency.39 °
Citizens have access to information regarding how much the fund
earns and how the revenues are distributed. 39' The importance of
openness in the way public revenues are managed cannot be
overemphasized as it comports with the time-honored dictum that
"sunshine is a disinfectant., 392
The philosophical underpinnings and the structure of the APF
present both benefits and grounds for criticisms. The legal and
philosophical basis of the APF is the idea that the ownership of
Alaska's oil resides in the people of the state and this lucrative
resource should be utilized for their maximum benefit.3 93
Therefore, an important point of the fund is that it promotes the
idea of stakeholding; it gives the citizens a stake in a natural
resource found in their territory.3 94 The Fund is based on a belief
that Alaskans are the primary stakeholders of their oil wealth.3 95
The fund is also credited with increasing personal income and
employment in Alaska and at the same time mitigating
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 See ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 372.
391 Id.
392 See Mary Graham, Is Sunshine the Best Disinfectant: The Promise and Problems
of Environmental Disclosure, 20 BROOKINGS REV. 18, 18 (2002) (quoting Louis D.
Brandeis' statement that "publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases ... [s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants").
393 TSALIK, supra note 370, at 20.
394 Bruce Ackerman & Anne Alstott, Your Stake in America, 41 ARIZ. L. REv. 249,
260 (1999).
395 TSALIK, supra note 370, at 20.
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recessions.396 One writer has marshaled the strong points and
weaknesses of the APF in the following words:
It is based on the principle that citizens are the owners of their
mineral wealth and that every citizen is entitled to an equal share
of this wealth. It adheres to the libertarian belief that people will
be better off spending their own money rather than allowing the
state to spend it on their behalf. By involving citizens in every
aspect of the Fund's creation and evolution, the APF has given
the public a stake in its preservation, and restrained the
government from spending away oil wealth in a more effective
way than any formal rules could. Although no rules require
payment of dividends, the program is so popular that the
legislature has always chosen to continue it. Such an approach,
however, has drawbacks. The absence of a needs component has
led to an inefficient distribution of wealth, since individuals in
the highest tax bracket receive the same amount as the poorest
Alaskans. The diffusion of economic resources that results from
sending a check to every Alaskan comes at the cost of targeting
funds to address social and economic needs. Moreover, one
might also question the prudence of sending dividend checks to
every citizen as the state slashes its operating budget and lays off
employees to make ends meet. Critics of the libertarian
approach also argue that governments are better placed to pursue
economic diversification and wealth distribution than individuals
in the marketplace.3 9
7
Ironically, as indicated above, the fund's popularity has
opened the doors for critics to assail the APF. Due to the fund's
popularity, politicians are not eager to tap dividend money or
channel APF revenues to other important state services, even when
the need to infuse money into those services can hardly be
emphasized.3 98 Nevertheless, Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott
have presented a counter-argument that "the value of stakeholding
is sufficiently great to justify a priority over most other competing
396 See Ackerman & Alstott, supra note 394, at 260 n.28 (citing J. Patrick O'Brien
& Dennis 0. Olson, The Alaska Permanent Fund and Dividend Distribution Program,
18 PuB. FiN. Q. 139 (1990)).
397 TSALIK, supra note 370, at 25.
398 Id.
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programs."3 99
Overall, the APF is considered a successful experiment."'
After all, it "has been successful in turning Alaska's depleting oil
resource into a renewable financial resource." 40 1  This is a
commendable feat considering that the non-renewability of
petroleum resources should be a major concern of all oil-
producing entities.
3. Nunavut
The Nunavut Trust of Canada presents an important example
of a community-based trust fund. Svetlana Tsalik describes the
fund and its attraction as follows:
Unlike government-run oil funds, the Nunavut Trust is a
community-managed fund. It has earned strong returns while
maintaining accountability to its constituents and serves as a
good example for [other] underdeveloped oil-producing regions.
... The Trust also demonstrates how these communities can be
compensated for the negative external consequences of oil
development, and how they can turn such compensation into an
enduring source of income.40 2
The Nunavut Trust was established to receive and manage the
capital transfer payments from the Canadian government to the
Nunavut Territory consequent upon the Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement.4 3 The Agreement led to the creation of the new
territory of Nunavut on April 1, 1999.404 The Nunavut people will
receive the sum of $1.2 billion dollars in compensation money in
the course of fourteen years, ending in 2007.45 This money is
399 Ackerman & Alstott, supra note 394, at 260 n.28.
400 See Hoopengardner, supra note 375, at 358.
401 Id. at 358-59.
402 TSALIK, supra note 370, at 46.
403 See Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, May 25, 1993, Inuit-Can., art. 29, available at
http://www.tunngavik.com/site-eng/nlca/artic129.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004);
Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the
Queen in right of Canada, May 25, 1993, Inuit-Can., art. 31, available at
http://www.tunngavik.com/site-eng/nlca/articl31 .htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
404 See Welcome to Nunavut, at http://www.polamet.ca/polarnet/nunavut.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2004).
405 Id.
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channeled through the Nunavut Trust, which is under a duty to
protect and enhance the funds for the benefit of the people.4"6
Two important features of the Nunavut Trust deserve special
mention. First, there is no dividend program under the Nunavut
Trust.40 7 The dividend arrangement was expressly rejected by the
Trust's designers in order to avoid what they perceived to be
mistakes in other funds.40 8 A striking example is that of the
Samson Cree of Alberta which received more than $2 billion from
the time of the oil booms of the 1970s.4"9 The Crees introduced a
dividend program entitling every Cree to $40,000 once he or she
reached the age of 18.410 Unfortunately, a substantial portion of
dividend money was squandered on personal consumption, with
attendant high levels of alcoholism and death and with hardly any
improvement in the material well being of the community. 41 A
second feature is the separation of investment function from the
responsibility of expenditure of the Trust proceeds.412 Thus, the
mandate of the trustees covers earning returns while a separate
entity representing beneficiaries, the Nunavut Tunngavik, Inc.
(NTI), concerns itself with fashioning the best ways to spend the
money for the people's benefit. 4 The import of this arrangement
is that "fund managers invest in a mix of fixed income securities
and foreign and domestic stocks with the sole purpose of
maximizing return on investment while minimizing risk. 41 4
Oversight is provided through appointed trustees who serve
three-year terms and cannot be removed without cause.415 Every
Inuit beneficiary also has the right to institute legal action against
the trustees for breach of duty, which helps in enhancing
accountability.1 6
406 Id.
407 TSALIK, supra note 370, at 47.
408 Id.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Id. at 48.
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A veritable challenge to a trust of this nature is the danger of
creating dependencies on the part of beneficiaries. Another
problem is that in view of limited obstacles in the trust structure to
avoid spending the trust's principal, the pressure to do so may
mount when difficult circumstances arrive. 417 The managers of
the Nunavut Trust would need to face these hurdles squarely and
prevail.
D. Community-Based Trust Funds for Nigeria
1. The Case for and General Features of Local Trust
Funds
National trust funds such as that established under the Chad-
Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project have some strong points. They aid
transparency and accountability and ensure that governments
allocate more money for national community development.
Nevertheless, they cannot be a complete panacea and do not
purport to be such. There is sometimes a tendency, however, to
assume that addressing corruption and other vices at the national
level automatically translates into the eradication of such problems
at the local levels, thus bringing all the benefits to all the citizens,
regardless of where they are.418 This is not necessarily the case
though, and there may be the need to directly address the
corruption that also thrives at the local level.419 Because of local-
based corruption, the majority of the people in local resource
communities are often deprived of the benefit of the money
earmarked for them.42 °
In some cases, governments may be reluctant to set up national
trust funds.421 Chad had little option but to accept the World
Bank's demands because of its poor economic situation.422
Administering huge national funds may also involve enormous
transaction costs that could make them unproductive and
417 See id. at 47-48.
418 See FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 49.
419 Id. at 52.
420 Id.
421 NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153.
422 Revenue Management Plan, supra note 346, at 98.
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unattractive. " ' Further, in a big country like Nigeria, there are
serious doubts that a national fund, as shown in the case of
OMPADEC, and perhaps the NDDC, will be able to address the
needs of all the people.424 Smaller arrangements that are easier to
manage may, in some instances, prove more palatable and
effective.425 Thus, community-based trust funds present a useful
option.
Community-based trust funds will directly confront and tackle
the inadequacies of the existing community development
arrangements present in some places. The opacity surrounding the
current approaches to community development has provided
ample room for corruption to become a way of life, cutting across
different facets in the oil-producing areas, including community
leaders and corporate executives.426 Speculations are rife about
inflated figures by oil companies on social expenditures to gain
some tax and other advantages.427
To be effective, it may be necessary for community-based trust
funds in Nigeria to marginalize the government, since the high
level of governmental inefficiency and ineptitude in the country
may become stumbling blocks to achieving the funds'
objectives.428 A government representative may be included in the
Governing Board, as this may be crucial in securing the
government's support or funding for such an arrangement, but the
government should not play any key role in running the Board.429
Even in countries with more efficient governments, a local trust
423 See Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 9.
424 See id. at 12.
425 Id.
426 See FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 52 (stating "there are some indications that a
significant proportion of the oil companies' community budget was misappropriated by
oil company staff, local contractors or chiefs") (citation omitted). See also Kemedi,
supra note 291 (elaborating on the relationship between oil companies and state
officials).
427 FRYNAS, supra note 4, at 51-52.
428 See Okechukwu Ibeanu, Oiling the Friction: Environmental Conflict
Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 6 ENvTL. CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REP.
19, 32 (2000).
429 See Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 16 (stating the importance of striking
the balance between the government and non-governmental representatives of the
board).
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fund can be structured to dispense with governmental involvement
or management. For instance, the Nunavut Trust described above
is run by community members independent of governmental
involvement.43 °
An important aspect of the proposed trust funds is the public's
participation in environmental and developmental decision-
making. Under Nigerian customary law, communal property is
usually managed by those in a position of trust, with the active
participation of other community members who are co-owners of
the property.43'
Community members will play an active role in directly
electing the trustees of the fund. A major function of the trustees,
through a management body and in close consultation with the
respective communities, will be the designing of projects that are
beneficial to the people and the overseeing of their proper
completion.
Oil-producing communities need an alternative economic base
to replace what has been destroyed by the oil industry. They also
need adequate institutions, such as well-equipped and properly
functioning hospitals and schools, to take care of their immediate
needs and prepare themselves for the kind of future that is suited
to their new conditions as centers of major economic activities.
This approach would be consistent with the aphorism that it is
better to teach a person how to fish than to give a person a fish.
The trust funds would handle some smaller projects, but should
also be in a position to pool resources from multiple sources
(including oil corporations and development institutions) and
undertake bigger projects that ordinarily fall outside the capacity
430 See Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in right of Canada, May 25, 1993, Inuit-Can., art. 29, available at
http://www.tunngavik.com/site-eng/nlca/articl29.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2004)
(establishing that monies payable to the Trust are under the Trustees' control).
431 YAKUBU, supra note 342, at 63. Yakubu states:
[Elvery member of the community has the right to take part directly or
indirectly in the management of the community land. The participation is direct
where a member takes an active part in making decisions and in consultations
on community land. It is indirect where he only takes part in selecting the Chief
and other elders or councillors. It has been held that the requirement of
consultation is a requirement of law and not just a matter of convenience by the
Chief or elders to be observed or disregarded.
Id. (citation omitted).
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
or scope of individual company budgets. This would be preferable
to situations where oil companies might take up minor projects as
a token gesture and would avoid duplicative efforts. This scenario
would result in a variance of what economists refer to as
"coordination benefits," by which people find that it is in their
greater interest to work together than going at it alone.432
2. Key Features of Proposed Trust Funds
a) Legal Structure
The trust funds should have a separate legal personality, be
self-governing institutions and possess a credible governance
structure.433 They may be created by Deeds of Trust or chartered
by the government.434
b) Financial Structure
This could take the form of an endowment, revolving fund, or
sinking fund.4 35  Revolving funds can have new assets added
periodically, possibly yearly and through special taxes and
contributions.436 Because of this, revolving funds are the preferred
option that this article recommends for oil-producing communities
in Nigeria. Likely sources of funding would be the oil companies,
which could contribute a certain percentage of their annual profits.
Development agencies could also be useful in providing additional
funds. As progress is made, the government could also become a
financial contributor.437
432 This is akin to prisoner's dilemma and game theory. For a discussion of
coordination benefits, see Cary Coglianese, Globalization and the Design of
International Institutions, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 297, 298-300
(Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
433 Most of the ideas in this section are drawn from Guerin-McManus, supra note
318 and the sources cited therein. I have also adapted some of the applicable features of
the Chad RMP.
434 Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 13.
435 Id. at 17-19.
436 Id. at 17-18.
437 See id. at 19-20 (stating that "[m]ajor sources of funding for trust funds also
come from multilateral donors, private and NGO donors, and even host governments").
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c) Governance Structure
The trust funds should have a governing body that is
representative of the diversity in the community.438 There should
be a board of trustees (Board) representing the interests of all
stakeholders, including the government, community, industry and
NGOs.439 The recommended approach in this article is that
community members elect their representatives. This will give
them a sense of belonging and promote accountability of
community leaders. The Board will be the legal owners of the
funds and should determine, with the active participation of
community members, priority areas where the funds would be
spent. The Board will give general directions to the Management
Unit on implementation of those ideas.
d) Management Unit
This unit should be responsible for numerous functions,
including the preparation of annual work plans and budgets, the
development of implementing systems for the processing of grant
proposals and the implementation of project activities, the
development of strategies for capacity-building, and the institution
of systems for financial accountability. 440 The Management Unit
should also report to the board of trustees on program and project
implementation and play a key role in developing strategies for
fundraising.44'
e) Monitoring Unit
A unit within the trust should be responsible for monitoring the
expenditures of the trust funds and those of other institutions such
as the NDDC to ensure that funds are being properly utilized for
the benefit of the community (area) and in compliance with the
governing rules.442 The Monitoring Unit should publish regular
reports and should make its activities open. Documents in its
possession should be accessible to the public at their offices, on
438 Id. at 15.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 See id. at 24.
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the internet and upon request.
J) International Oversight Group
This group should consist of representatives of international
financial and developmental institutions and credible domestic and
international NGOs, scholars and political leaders who will ensure
that the major units, including the Board, Management Unit, and
Monitoring Unit, are performing their functions. They should
operate independently, and their findings should always be made
public.
g) Location of Trusts and Assets
A trust fund or its assets could be located domestically or
abroad.443 A domestic trust with domestic asset management is the
preferred choice, though, because it has a greater potential to build
domestic capacity in trust and financial management while
promoting a sense of local ownership of the trust.444
The process of establishing a trust fund should commence with
a feasibility study.44 The object of the feasibility study would be
to answer a number of important questions, the most salient of
which center around the workability of the trust fund concept in
the target community, the availability of alternatives, and the
presence of a legal and financial framework in the host country to
provide needed support for the trust.446 The process of preparing
or conducting the feasibility study should involve consultations
with stakeholder representatives, government representatives,
scientists, conservationists, economists, lawyers, business
representatives and community leaders." 7 This group should be
responsible for determining the needs of the target community, the
primary and wider objectives that the trust fund seeks to
accomplish, and the kind of development projects that it will
finance.448
443 See id. at 21.
444 Id.
445 Id. at 8.
446 Id. at 8-10.
447 Id. at 10
448 Id. at 10-11.
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3. Benefits of Local Trust Funds
a) Proper Management of Oil Revenues
A trust fund will play a key role in ensuring that revenues are
properly managed. With an elected Board of Trustees accountable
to the community members and a Management Unit that is
carefully chosen, the chances of a prudent and beneficial
application of community funds are enhanced.
In managing oil revenues, the community-based trust funds
will not become a replacement for the NDDC. However, it has
some features that make it a better alternative to the NDDC in
some aspects. First, it will utilize a bottom-up approach to
management, not the top-down approach favored by the
government." 9 One of the problems faced by the NDDC,
especially at the initial stage, was the absence of acceptance by the
communities who were supposed to benefit from the projects. 5 °
In a particular incident recounted by the NDDC Chairman,
community members attacked a contractor and forced him to
abandon a construction project in the community. 51 Where real
participation exists and the people truly 'own' the projects, as is
likely to be the case with community-owned and community-run
trust funds, such problems are not likely to be encountered.
On the other hand, there are certain things that trust funds of
this size may not be able to accomplish, but which a big
development agency like the NDDC can handle with ease.452 One
example is attracting investors into the area and collaborating to
start giant industrial outfits.453 Some projects also inure to the
benefit of many communities such as roads and bridges. The
NDDC can continue to exercise responsibility over those common
areas. Further, some communities may not be disposed toward the
idea of trust funds or may be incapable of managing their funds at
the moment due to intra-community crisis or leadership struggles
and may opt for continued management by the NDDC.
449 NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153.
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 Guerin-McManus, supra note 318, at 12-13.
453 Id. at 13.
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b) Monitoring of Resource Flows to Communities
A trust fund can function as a monitoring mechanism.45 4 It can
monitor the flow of oil revenues into the oil-producing
communities. Information gathered from such monitoring could
be used to assess the performance of those entrusted with
managing the funds. The presence of monitoring could also deter
corruption and waste as managers know that they would be held
accountable.
Monitoring may also be augmented by oversight provided by
external bodies. A hallmark of the proposed local trust funds
would be transparency guaranteed through an oversight
mechanism involving domestic and international NGOs, external
auditors and international financial and development institutions.
c) Democracy-Building
Trust funds can also serve as a veritable foundation for
building democratic structures in other areas of political
governance. They could promote a culture of democracy by
facilitating the active participation of community members in
establishing a local governance structure for resource allocation
and utilization.5 5 Such participation, while commencing with oil-
related matters, is expected to extend to, and permeate, other
aspects of community life and become entrenched within the
governance of these communities.
Local trust funds can also build democracy by reducing or
eliminating corruption through a transparent and accountable
approach to management.456 In a report released in April 2004,
Freedom House identified corruption and a weak judiciary as the
principal impediments to democratic development.4 57
454 See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste
Regulation: Are Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
706, 747 (1998); Scott Hitch, Losing the Elephant Wars: CITES and the "Ivory Ban, " 27
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 167, 182 (1998).
455 See Ibeanu, supra note 428, at 29.
456 Id. at 31. See also Kemedi, supra note 291 (recommending transparency from
governments to encourage democracy).
457 Press Release, Freedom House, Survey: Corruption And Weak Judiciary Are
Key Obstacles To Democracy (Apr. 6, 2004), at http://www.freedomhouse.org/media/
pressreI/040604.htm.
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Successful trust funds will give community members a sense
of ownership of development projects. Local trust funds will
provide an economic base for communities, leading to less
violence and conflicts within the communities, thereby removing
obstacles to democratization."' The Niger Delta has been plagued
by violence within communities, and between communities on one
side and the corporations and government on the other.459
Community members have sought to disrupt elections or oppose
the operations of the NDDC and others.46 ° Much of this violence
owes its genesis and sustenance in part to perceptions about the
mismanagement of oil revenues. 6'
Local trust funds will also promote democracy through
stakeholding. A community-based trust fund will give
communities a stake in the funds, giving greater incentive to
closely monitor how the money is spent. Political history suggests
that where people have a stake in the public revenue that consists
of their taxes, they have an incentive to demand representation to
462
accompany the taxation.
Moreover, community-based trust funds can aid
democratization through group formation. They will help reduce
the stronghold of the government on oil revenues, thereby helping
to redistribute wealth in the oil-producing areas. The rise of
democracy in Europe and America has been traced to the
emergence of an independent bourgeosie.163  Because of their
independence from the state, this group was able to serve as a
458 See Kemedi, supra note 291.
459 Ibeanu, supra note 428, at 23-24.
460 NEWSWATCH Interview, supra note 153.
461 See Winter, supra note 157.
462 See, e.g., FISCAL CRISES, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, 1450-
1789, at 18 (Philip T. Hoffman & Kathryn Norberg eds., 1994); RUDOLF BRAUN, THE
FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE (Charles Tilly ed., 1975)
(explaining that Estates permitted taxation in exchange for princely concessions); Robert
H. Bates & Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, A Note on Taxation, Development, and
Representative Government, 14 POLITICS & SOCIETY 55-57 (1985) (discussing the link
between taxation and representation in England and France).
463 See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 413-32
(1966).
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check on public officials and hold them accountable.464 With the
concentration of the wealth in the government, the emergence of
such a group in Nigeria in general, and in the oil-producing areas
in particular, has been frustrated.465 Reducing the stronghold the
government has on oil revenues through trust funds will assist in
the emergence of a vibrant middle class that would be independent
of the state, and ultimately lead to democracy in these areas and
the entire country.
d) Other Benefits
Some of the trust funds, like the APF, may decide to invest a
portion of their funds in national and international capital markets
and distribute a percentage of the earnings from such investments
to community members.466  Drawing from the approach
popularized by the Grameen Bank, some trust funds may devote a
lot of resources to extending micro-credit, especially to local
women, to facilitate their transition into a position of financial
independence.467 The conservation of land, and the preservation
and restoration of areas of communal heritage could also form
significant portions of a community trust fund's mandate. 68
4. Prospects for Local Trust Funds
Based on preliminary discussions and correspondence with
representatives of oil corporations, communities, financial and
development institutions and NGOs, there is a favorable
disposition toward this concept. 4" This support is anchored on
464 Id. at 417.
465 See Ibeanu, supra note 428, at 31.
466 Information on Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation is available on its website:
http://www.apfc.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
467 For information on the bank, see http://www.grameen-info.org (last visited Apr.
17, 2004). For a discussion on the benefits and shortcomings of micro financing as a
tool for development, see Editorial Desk, Microcredit's Limits, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2004, at IA.
468 This could be done through easements or other appropriate legal arrangements.
On land trusts and easements, see Barton H. Thompson, Non-Profit Land Trusts &
Conservation Easements, Stanford Law School (June 25, 2002) (on file with the author).
See also Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector
Conservation, 8 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 209, 240 (1998) (discussing conservation
easements and conservation agreements as tools for land conservation).
469 See Kemedi, supra note 291, (Kemedi is Head of Programs at an NGO in
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some of the attractive features of trust funds discussed above,
including provisions for public participation and emphasis on
transparency and accountability.470 According to Tony Ile, an
estate valuer and community activist in Rivers State, a major oil-
producing state:
There are several sources of funds for community development
in Nigeria, especially oil-producing communities. The issue is
not how much will be spent and on what projects. The real issue
is who makes decisions over the money that accrues to the
communities. In determining the real social power of
communities over their resources and environment, communities
must have a platform to articulate their needs, negotiate their
demands with Government and companies, participate actively
in the development process and exercise control over financial
resources that are meant for them. There is no better way to
achieve this than through the Community Development Trust
Fund. The CDTF will enable local communities to understand
and participate in decision-making process over funds and
projects according to needs of stakeholders in the community.
The CDTF enforces on each community a process of
accountability based on actual performance. In a democracy
nurtured by the will of the people, the CDTF becomes a
platform for sustaining community visions and development
plans in order to achieve social peace based on justice and
equity. We need the CDTF.47'
Responding to this author's questionnaire, ChevronTexaco
stated with regard to the trust funds proposal contained herein that
it "[1]ooks like a good arrangement.... The Trust Fund should be
run devoid of political posturing and focused on the people who
would benefit. The managers ought to be accountable to an
external audit system that includes international monitors. 47 z
Royal/Dutch Shell's Nigeria affiliate has also welcomed the
proposal, while sounding a note of caution and displaying a
measure of skepticism:
This model will work where there is honesty and transparency.
Nigeria known as Our Niger Delta).
470 Id.
471 E-mail from Chizor Wisdom Dike to Emeka Duruigbo, supra note 191.
472 ChevronTexaco, Response to Questions, supra note 196.
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But intra play of power, and dominance by a group or class can
derail the good objectives. In a community environment where
culture and power dictates and overrides decisions by the
majority, success cannot be assured [at] all times. Every [new]
mechanism or model has to be tested, noting also the location
specific impact ..... While some communities will welcome a
Trust Fund properly established and managed, others will
demand direct access to the funds to "do it their way." All
depends on the power structure at play at any particular time.473
A cautious, or perhaps cynical, way of looking at corporate
support for this idea is to view it not as inveterate, but as an
attempt by oil corporations to play the public relations game.
However, it is also reasonable not to lose sight of the fact that the
current scheme of things has taken a toll on all stakeholders,
including corporations, since corporate community development
activities have not been very fruitful, opening them to criticisms
and frustrating their operations. They may, therefore, be
genuinely interested in true reforms to improve oil revenue
management.
The trust fund arrangement represents a needed change in
architecture4 74 that is expected to interact with and affect the social
norms and other modes of regulation at the corporate and
community levels.475 With enhanced economic development,
473 Shell Nigeria, Response to Questions, supra note 198.
474 The idea of a structure or architecture as a useful form of achieving policy
objectives dates at least as far back as Karl Llewelyn. See LAW & SOCIETY: READINGS IN
THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995):
Karl Llewellyn, the famous legal theorist, who died in 1962, liked to talk about
the highway "cloverleaf." This, of course, is a method of structuring entrance to
and exit from a major highway or freeway. Legislatures could pass laws
regulating or prohibiting left turns across busy lanes of oncoming traffic.
However, these laws require police and traffic courts to enforce them. The
cloverleaf is more effective. The roadway or ramp sharply turns off the main
highway to the right, and then turns to cross over the road on a bridge, or under
it through a tunnel. If the lanes of the main highway are separated by a fence or
ditch, it is almost impossible to make an illegal left turn. Also, highway
engineers can force drivers to slow from superhighway speeds by the way they
bank the cloverleaf. The socially desired behavior - slowing down - becomes
far easier than deviance for the typical motorist.
Id. at 444.
475 For an excellent discussion of the modes of regulating behavior, namely law,
architecture, markets and social norms, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS
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community members will likely opt for other sources of energy
currently beyond their reach, thereby easing the pressure on the
forests, from which they collect wood as fuel.476 Moreover,
constant tensions and conflicts and the attendant police and
military brutality could be dramatically reduced as people see
themselves moving up in the social ladder.477 Viewed from that
perspective, trust funds could be seen as important vehicles that
can, in one instrument, confront and address not only traditional
social and economic issues, but also human rights and
environmental problems in the oil-producing communities.
VII.Conclusion
Oil-producing communities in Nigeria have suffered numerous
negative effects of oil and gas development. The government of
Nigeria and the multinational oil corporations operating in these
communities have introduced initiatives to address these problems
and promote a better life for the residents of these communities.
Unfortunately, primarily because of corruption and a lack of real
public participation, the positive effects of the corporate financing
tools and public measures have been minimal. Moreover, the
efforts of the most recent public initiative, the NDDC, are not
likely to adequately address some of the pressing needs of the
communities, particularly in the sense of having control over their
resources or revenues flowing from them. This work has therefore
made a case for local trust funds as important institutions that will
help oil-producing communities take control of their destinies and
ensure an equitable management of their oil revenues.
The trust funds proposed in this article would be run by
community members for their own benefit. These funds would
not be a replacement of the NDDC but should be able to address
each community's unique needs. Transparency and accountability
should define the trust funds' operations. Credible monitoring and
oversight mechanisms should be incorporated into the instrument
creating the trust. Apart from serving as financing mechanisms,
OF CYBERSPACE 85-88 (1999, and Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberspace Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REV. 501 (1999).
476 See Robert T. Deacon & Bemardo Mueller, Political Economy and Natural
Resource Use (Jan. 1, 2004) (working paper) (on file with the University of California,
Santa Barbara), at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucsbecon/dwp/0 1-04/.
477 See Ibeanu, supra note 428, at 29.
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these trust funds will help community members develop a culture
of democracy that will prove useful in other aspects of community
and national life.
